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ILLEGITIMATE SETTLEMENTS IN WEST BEIRUT:
A MANIPULATION OF TENURE POLICIES
AND CLASS STRUGGLE OVER LAND
Abstract
Planners and politicians in Lebanon have been associating settlement formation with
the inability of legal authorities to impose the law and the prevailing chaotic situation in the
country since the civil war. In this study, I will argue that, since the turn of the century,
settlement formation is also connected to the competition of various groups over land where
technocrats and elites have been constantly using tenure and land policies to control land. This
competition, though not specific to Lebanon, took different forms since the Ottoman period
until the present time, where each period contributed directly or indirectly to settlement
formation. The previous attempts to provide the poor with land titles have collapsed due to the
lack of a support systems which help the poor overcome the complexities and the obligations
associated with these titles. This study analyzes land policies since the late Ottoman period to
illustrate the power struggle over land between the elites and the poor. The study will finally
present the possible implications to granting tenure to settlers without a cohesive body of state
support to maintain these titles. The arguments of this study are based on the following:
(1)- Historically, the Ottoman introduced innovations to existing forms of land
tenure to maintain their revenues from agricultural land. These innovations were
manipulated by established families and a rising bourgeoisie to acquire communal
lands in rural areas. These policies contributed to the informal presence of peasants
in urban areas.
(2)- The French attempted to spread equity and justice by rationalizing planning and
institutionalizing land management. They superimposed secular public institutions
on a harsh sectarian society. These institutions made extensive use of elites as
administrators and legislators. The elites of each community competed over land
and resources regardless of their poor's needs.
(3)- In the post-Independence era, land use and land tenure have been manipulated
by elites and rising technocrats, who were influenced by western mode of
development, to facilitate the process of capital accumulation and economic
development. Legislations served certain groups and discriminated against others
which widened the disparities in land ownership and income distribution.
(4)- After 1975, the total absence of the state, which led to the inertness of the
elites' role in land control, encouraged the poor to invade public lands and to force
their rights for better living conditions. Meanwhile, the state attitude towards
informal settlements and access to land by the poor remained unchanged and was
manifested in the latest 1986 master plan.
i
Acknowledgement
To Allah, the All Knowledgeable and the Exalted in Might, I present my first and
last recognition for guiding me and giving me the strength to accomplish this endeavor in a
very short time.
I would also like to use this opportunity to thank all the people who opened the way
for me for such an enriching experience. I would like to mention, in particular, Professor
Lisa Peattie, my research advisor for being extremely helpful in directing the arguments of
the study and structuring the constituents of the thesis. I am also doubly indebted to
Professor William Doebele at Harvard University whose detailed comments have helped to
sharp my ideas and enabled me to link history to the present land conflict in Beirut. The
patience of both professors with my written English was unfailing. However, working
closely and simultaneously with both of them was a rewarding and a very stimulating
experience. Their commitment to academic life and students set for me an ideal which I wish
to follow in the future. I am also grateful to Professor Llyod Rodwin who accompanied me
during a whole year and who gave me his precious time advising me. I would also like to
thank Professor Lawrence Susskind for being supportive since the initiation of this study
and his continuous encouragements throughout the final term.
I wish, in particular, to put on record my thanks: to my wife Maha whose support
and tenderness made it possible for me to accomplish this study, to my brothers Issam
Kayssi and Jamal Abed, who invariably spared time and made the effort to listen to me and
to discuss the arguments of this study, without them this study would not have been
submitted on time, to my father Souheil and my uncle Rafiq Halabi who spared no pains to
put me in touch with the institutions and people I needed to visit, to Dr. Wafa Charafeddine
who supplied me with the valuable information on about the Ouzai corridor and the
necessary maps and photos for the analysis; and to the support staff of the department of
urban studies and planning at M.I.T., especially Rolf Engler and Mary Grenham, who
supported me since I joined the program in September 1986.
Last but not least, I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. Rafiq El-Hariri, my
sponsor, and the people working in the Hariri Foundation. Finally, without the
administrative and financial assistance of this foundation, I would not have been able to go
through such a profitable and enriching experience.
ii
Table of contents
A b stract ..........................................................-- . --- - .. i
Acknowledgement ....................................................................-..- ii
IN TR O D U C T IO N ................................................................................. 1
CHAPTER I LEBANON DURING THE OTTOMAN PERIOD .................... 8
1.1 L ebanon ......................................................................... 8
1.2 Ottoman tenure policies before 1858 .......................................... 9
1.3 The 1858 Ottoman land code ................................................. 10
1.4 Lebanon after the 1862 Protocol............................................12
1.5 Final remarks..................................................................15
CHAPTER II THE FRENCH MANDATE...............................................17
2.1 Greater Lebanon and the new political order ................................. 17
2.2 The French administrative reforms ........................... 18
2.3 French attempts to rationalize planning.....................................21
2.4 Failure of the French reforms ............................................... 22
2.5 Conclusive remarks...........................................................23
CHAPTER III THE POST INDEPENDENCE ERA: 1943 TO 1974 ..................... 27
3.1 Political development in modem Lebanon ................................... 27
3.2 The Lebanese economic policies ............................................ 30
3.3 Failure of economic policies.................................................31
3.4 Modem planning attempts .................................................... 32
3.5 Effect of social pluralism, economic policies, and planning
on slum formation .............................................................. 35
3.6 S um m ary .......................................................................... 36
CHAPTER IV THE POST 1975 ERA, THE CIVIL WAR ................................. 39
4.1 Effects of the war on the public sector ..................................... 39
4.2 Economic constraints of the post war era..................................40
4.3 The creation of the Council for Development and ...........................
Reconstruction-CDR:........................................................ 42
4.4 Final remarks..................................................................44
CHAPTER V CASE STUDY: THE OUZAI CORRIDOR ................................. 46
6.1 Building the corridor ............................................................ 46
L.a The period from 1950 to 1969...................................46
1.b The period from 1970 to 1975...................................47
l.c The period between 1978 and 1982.............................48
L.d The post 1983 era. ............................................. 50
6.2 Consolidation as a response to repressive state practices .................. 51
6.3 The consolidation process .................................................... 53
3.a Building on municipal land....................................53
3.b Building the private properties...................................54
6.4 The creation of a thriving land market in the corridor ....................... 54
6.5 The present urban fabric of the corridor....................................56
5.a The Ouzai settlement ............................................ 56
5.b The Jnah settlement ............................................ 58
6.6 The choice of the corridor for illegal settlements...........................59
6.7 Concluding remarks.............................................................59
CHAPTER VI WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? ...................................... 64
6.1 Where Do We Go From Here?................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.2 Postscript ....................................................................... 70
Appendix I........................................................... .... ..... ...... I
A ppendix II...................................................................... ...............- 11
Appendix III.................................................................... III
A ppendix IV ........................................................................................ IV
BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................. VI
In The Name of Allah, The Merciful and The Compassionnate
INTRODUCTION
In Lebanon, policy makers and planners insist that settlement formation is the
result of political rivalries, which prevented the state from enforcing the law since
independence, and the chaotic situation since 1975. In this study, I will argue that
settlement formation is also connected to the hegemony of various groups over land since
the turn of the century where ruling classes have been constantly using influence,
position, and money to serve their interests. Thus monopolizing access to land and
controlling resources.
This power struggle involved two major players. The state-elite coalition, on one
hand, sought to control land to facilitate the process of capital accumulation and economic
growth. The poor, on the other hand, who considered land ownership as an amenity for
social stability, were denied access to land. Each of the two groups viewed tenure and
land policies differently. The first group used land policies as a tool to control
development on the macro level, while the poor, who lost confidence in the legal system,
considered these policies to be unjust and biased. This paradox emerged a gradual divorce
between public policies and their application resulting at the end in the creation of illegal
settlements.
To support these arguments, this study will analyze the state-elite relations and
their manipulations of land policies since the late Ottoman period until the present time.
The case study chosen will illustrate the implications of state policies on urban
development and the various conflicts generated as the state becomes unable to enforce the
law. Finally, this study will conclude with a set of guidelines, based upon historical
precedents and present conditions, to be taken into considerations for future land policies .
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During the Ottoman period there was an attempt to provide the poor with land titles
at the cost of their collective land. In other words, they were given land that was already
theirs. Assuming that the process was intentionally good, the poor soon lost their land due
to the absence of a support system to maintain this ownership. The support system, which
existed in the early days of the Ottoman rule, was slowly replaced by a feudal hierarchy,
which the Ottoman developed to secure revenues on the local level. This hierarchy led in
1858 to a civil war, which obliged the Ottoman to undertake substantial reforms on the
social and political level. However, the waning feudal system readjusted to the changes
and reintegrated within the newly created institutions, which allowed it to shape the
legislations of the future state at the cost of the poor's rights.
Since the independence the state adopted tenure systems which were a mix of
Islamic doctrine, Ottoman and French innovations, and modem practices. This mixture
has confused land tenure and so far has created many cases of illegalities since
independence. In fact, the Ottoman and French innovations used in the system had
themselves created illegal access to land during the pre-independence eras. Migrants and
unprivileged groups formed illegal settlements using the confusion over land tenure.
Thus, failure of planning in Lebanon can be attributed to the will of legislators to
overcome political rivalries, social segregations, and loyalty to religion by simply
rationalizing planning. The failure of public policies to address the complexities of the
situation resulted in the incapability of the state to enforce the law in some cases and its
resort to negotiations over applying regulations in others. Furthermore, authorities'
decisions in such cases were not based upon the extent of derived public benefits in each
case. Rather, they were based on socio-political or religious affiliations of the settlers.
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The case of the Ouzai corridor, located in South Beirut, is an illustration of the
previously mentioned complexitiesI. Illegal settlements have existed around Beirut since
the early fifties in the form of "Misery Belts". The area of study is the Ouzai-Khaldeh
corridor (see map). It is situated on the southern periphery of West-Beirut. It is
surrounded by the Mediterranean sea to the West, city of Beirut to the North, the Airport
boulevard to the East, and the Airport to the South. It encompasses private, municipal and
Waqf properties the ownership of which has been disputed for fifty years. Illegal
invasions started in the late fifties but the settlement formation occurred in 1976 when
approximately seven thousand non Lebanese 2 slum residents were displaced from the
Eastern sector to the Western 3 sector of Beirut. To resettle they occupied existing
luxurious beach condominiums along the southern littoral of West Beirut. In 1978, during
a vast military operation by the Israeli Army in southern Lebanon, 250 thousand Shiite
refugees migrated towards major coastal cities4 , namely Beirut and Sidon, seeking
temporary shelter (see Figure 1 map of Lebanon). In Beirut, they settled in and around the
southern suburbs which became the largest concentration of this religious community in
Lebanon 5 (see figure 2 map of Beirut) and contained three quarters of a million Shiite
residents. The continuing outburst of hostilities in the south motivated the refugees to
either initiate new settlements further north in the Jnah area, or integrate within the Ouzai
corridor. The permanent stay of the refugees in the Ouzai area inflated the old settlement
from 70 acres before 1975 to approximately 125 acres in 1980. In 1986 the Ouzai
1 Abdul-Aziz Saqqaf in the Middle East city describes these complexities as "Lebanon isan arab state, yet
intricately linked to Europe. It consists of multi-ethnic and religious social groupings, yet its legal system
is based on the french system. It has a secular system, yet it works on the basis of religious compartments.
It has a highly urbanized society, yet it is fanatically tribalized. It is a"democracy", yet it has a pervasive
feudal structure. It is an affluent society, yet it has some of the Middle East's poorest people" (Saqqaf, 1987:
257).
2 The non Lebanese slum residents were Syrians, Kurds, and Palestinians.
3 Source: social welfare agencies working on site 1984.
4 Source: An-Nahar daily newspaper, March 11, 1978.
5 Source: As-Safir daily newspaper, July 15 1983.
Figure 1
The city of Beirut and the
Ouzai corridor (the area of
study). The illegal settlements
of Jnah (upper case) and Ouzai
(lower case) are situated on the
Western littoral of the Capital
and have increased by twenty
folds since the start of the civil
war.
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settlement was growing along 2.5 Km covering 200 acres 56% of which is public
land.The settlers created economic activities along the southern artery which crosses the
settlements and links West-Beirut to the rest of the country. The artery is designed to be
70 meters wide. Illegal constructions rendered the boulevard 30 m. wide.
Today, the growing demand for cheap housing and industrial space encourages the
settlers to maximize the use of land along the corridor and around Beirut International
Airport. As the settlements densified, they started expanding towards West Beirut. In
1986 local authorities opposed the settlements' expansion towards the capital and released
a general Master Plan for Beirut Metropolitan area in June 1986. The plan ignores the
presence of the settlements and denies the right of original settlers over land. The plan
implies that the settlements exist by default and should be removed as soon as the state can
reestablish its sovereignty. On the other hand the settlers relied on the confusion in the
tenure system to claiming legal rights over land.They insisted that the system has deprived
them as a community from access to land during the last century. In the corridor, they
presently were seeking social stability through access to vacant land, services, and
opportunities. All this further aggravated the state-squatters relationsl.
The focus of this study is to link the causes of settlement formation to historical
processes that started with the privatization of collective land (Mushaa) during the Ottoman
Period, to the institutionalization of lands during the French Mandate, and at last the
hegemony over land by the old aristocracy and traditional leaders. In broad outline, the
study stresses on the fact that the poor have succeeded in finding "a strategy" during
periods of uncertainty where the state and its institutions have failed to do so during
periods of prosperity. This study will conclude with a set of guidelines that should be
1 Anonymous sources stated that the original land owners had influenced the design of the Master Plan. As
a result, the settlement residents became skeptical of all forms of intervention whether for studying,
upgrading, or regulating the growth of the settlements.
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taken into consideration while changing the tenure system. It will also propose a set of
strategies the state ought to undertake instead of designing unrealistic master plans which
complicate the conflict. These strategies will decrease the tension in the state-squatters
relations until the reestablishment of order so that changes can be implemented without
disturbing the future Lebanese structure.
Primary and secondary sources of information were used for this study.
Secondary sources were used to document the socio-economic changes of feudalism in
Lebanon and the types of land codes that existed during the Ottoman and French rules and
their contribution to the present land tenure system. Primary resources were used to
explain the physical characteristics of the settlements, the process of consolidation, and the
different state measures to confront the growth of the settlements.
In January 1988, 1 conducted open-ended interviews with policy makers working
at the national Council for Development and Reconstruction, political leaders, city
officials, technocrats, neighborhood activists, and settlers. However, many difficulties
have faced the development of this study. Population censuses are outdated, the last
having been conducted in 1971. Data was hardly obtainable and sometimes inaccessible
within the prevailing conditions. Base maps are old, yet I managed to obtain a classified
drawing for the corridor prepared in 1983. Field work was extremely difficult, primarily
because of the state of insecurity and instability and the suspicious attitude of the local
militias towards any stranger. Interviews with residents and key persons have been
possible through personal contacts and the help of political elements to whom I am deeply
grateful.
This study is divided into six chapters. The first will review the various tenure
policies innovated by the Ottoman since the 1858 land code. It also analyzes Ottoman
tenure strategies and the different mechanisms used to provide the poor with formal
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access to land. Specifically, this chapter this chapter links the failure of the Ottoman
land policies to the lack of a comprehensive support system which help the poor
maintain land ownership during economic declines.The second covers the period
during the French Mandate.This section will describe the French attitude towards
Ottoman tenure systems, and how the French attempted to undermine a pre-existing
system by imposing another one based on Western practices with a flair of Islamic land
tenure terminology. In general, the French institutionalized land and created secular
public administration to a sectarian society which, theoretically, was entitled with
provision of a the support system on an equity basis. Again, this chapter evokes the
importance of traditional leadership, sectarianism and nepotism in the design and
implementation of land policies.The third chapter describes the state interventions
through planning from 1943 until 1974.The political development of this state has
reinforced the position of old aristocracy in the decision making. The analysis of the
political structure, the economic policies, and the planning strategies presented in this
chapter helps the reader understand the growing disparities between classes and
between regions in spite of the creation of a modern state. This pre-war era ended up
depriving the poor from both a formal access to land and a support system.The fourth
section analyzes the period between 1975 and 1988.This chapter will specifically look
at the direct effects of the war on both the public sector and the economy. Two major
points are stressed in this chapter. First, public institutions have been divided between
the East and the West of the capital. Each community attempted to alienate the resources
of the state into its sector of the capital leaving the rural areas to a total absence of state
support, law enforcement, and development.
Section five uses the Ouzai corridor as an illustration of former land policies and
class struggle over the control of land. This chapter look at the Ouzai corridor as the
only remaining location for illegal settlements in Lebanon in the aftermath of the war.
6
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This case shows that the poor succeeded in providing themselves with both access to
land and a support system without state intervention. This chapter, finally, raises issues
that are worth regarding in the future. The final chapter comes up with suggestions as
to where do we go after understanding the problem of illegal settlements. This section
presents guidelines for future urban land policies in Lebanon and short term strategies
that the state ought to adopt in order to reduce the tension in state-Shiites relations.
LEBANON DURING THE OTTOMAN PERIOD
1.1 Lebanon
Lebanon in its present form was conceived during the French Mandate, before that
date it was referred as the area between the South of Tripoli to the North of Sidon and from
the West of the Beqaa valley to the sea. Its population consisted of Christian, Druze, and
Muslim communities who had to compromise regularly over the control of land and
resources so as to make possible a minimum level of coexistence. "The distribution of
communities was the following: Christian Maronites, Shiite Muslims, and Druze lived
mainly in rural areas and villages, Sunni Muslims and Greek Orthodox were settled in large
urban centers along the Lebanese coast" (Buheiry, cited in Khalidi, 1984: 293). Two
modes of production coexisted in Lebanon. "One was an agrarian based economy in rural
areas where Lords and peasants shared unequally crop revenues" (Buheiry, cited in
Khalidi, 1984: 292). The other was "a mercantilist and industrial based economy in urban
centers which reflects a combination of both oriental and western social characters"
(Buheiry, cited in Khalidi, 1984: 293).
To be able to control this entity, the Ottoman governor had to innovate constantly
the applications of Ottoman laws, which were derived from the Islamic doctrine, and
maintain a balance of power between the different religious communities, chiefly, the Druze
and the Maronites. Further, he developed a feudal hierarchy within each community to help
him impose his political power and secure state revenues through taxing farm
products."This feudal hierarchy was not static and a pattern of fluctuating political influence
emerged"(Baaklini, 1976: 31).
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This hierarchy produced two categories of peasants: (a) Landowner peasants, with
access to the silk trading centers in nearby Beirut, constituted the rural bourgeoisie. (b)
Landless peasants were sharecroppers with small and often fractionned holdings. The
landless peasants revolted in 1858 in Lebanon to undermine the feudal hierarchy. "Many of
the long range causes or preconditions for the 1858 outbreak are, therefore, directly related
to land tenure" (Buheiry, cited in Khalidi, 1984: 293). The eventual result of this revolt
was a transition from landless to landowning peasants as will be discussed later. However,
the land tenure system in Lebanon made it difficult for an expanding peasantry to acquire
more land from established feudal lords.
1.2 Ottoman tenure policies before 1858
Classical Ottoman land tenure was based upon a combination of Islamic doctrine
and Ottoman innovation. In Islamic Doctrine land is divided into two major categories:
1) Mulk": is a freehold property used to describe Muslims' lands. These Muslims either
converted to Islam at the time of the Muslim conquest, or moved recently to the area.
Muslims are required to pay 10% of the land revenues as "Zakat" (legal Alms) to the less
fortunate of the community.
2) Kharaj": this category embraced all other land which belongs to non Muslims. Kharaj
refers to the tax levied on their properties.
The galloping inflation in the Ottoman economy during the 19th century obliged the
state to change the concepts of Mulk and Kharaj and, therefore, secure its revenues on as
regular basis as possible by institutionalizing taxes on farm products. Mulk became the
freehold of both Muslims and others who had chosen to retain their own religion
(Christians or Jews), while Kharaj, which represented 87% of the lands of the Ottoman
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Empire in 1528, became Miri (state) and Mushaal lands that were given to peasants to
cultivate. In return, peasants had to pay a form of tax ranging between 25 and 50 percent of
the yield of the lands. This tax was generalized over the Ottoman empire regardless of the
output of the land. The collection of taxes was assigned to individuals who would bid
against one another for the privilege at periodic auctions which placed taxpayers at the
mercy of tax collectors.
In Lebanon, the Ottoman governor innovated a new form of land sharing, in which
the peasant became a land partner with either the state or the lord if he develop the land and
pay its dues, to decrease the tension between feudal and the poor and, therefore,
undermined any attempt by the poor to revolt. This tenure policy resulted in two forms of
land sharing. "One does not involve the transfer of property to the peasant. It was applied
by the Khazins family in the Kisrawan region and it only involved the sharing of crops.
The other applied elsewhere in Mount-Lebanon where the proprietor would, after a certain
period of time, concede a parcel of land to a peasant "Sharik" who was in turn obliged to
plant it and share the proceeds with the proprietor as well as cultivate all the proprietor's
land" (Latron, 1936: 50). After a lapse of between five and ten years, however, the Sharik
acquired a quarter or a half of the land and trees in question as his own private holding.
This second form of land sharing offered the peasants the possibility of acquiring land.
However, in the period of transition from Ottoman to French rule the rights of these
peasants were denied, as will be discussed in the following chapter. "In both forms of land
sharing, the full burden of taxation was transferred from the proprietors to their Shariks.
The partner would loose his accumulated rights if he refrained from paying taxes" (Khalidi,
1984: 294). The system of tax collection increased the number of landless peasants, who
finally revolted in 1858 to undermine the existing feudal hierarchy.
1Mushaa is a system defined by Warriner as "a stage of transition between the completely communal
property system...and the completely divided property system" (Warriner, cited in Hamarneh,1985: 77).
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1.3 The 1858 Ottoman land code
Even before the revolt of 1858, the indirect eviction of landowners and cityward
movement provoked by the tax system and its application by feudal landowners caused the
Ottoman state to enact a series of reforms not only in Lebanon but throughout the empire.
As far as land tenure was concerned, the communal system of ownership was totally
abolished and three other categories were introduced. Hence, the code classified lands into
five categories (Ziadeh, 1979: 8):
1) Mulk land: Private property held in full ownership. Its ownership comprised two rights:
the right of absolute ownership, and the right to the usufruct of land. Both of these rights
belonged to the individual in this category.
2) Miri lands: Property owned by the state. Most of the agricultural land was classified as
Miri land in which the absolute ownership belonged to the state and the right of usufruct to
the individual. This land was either held as part of the royal-domain or was leased to
individuals to exploit it and pay dues or taxes to the state through various conditions of
tenure.
3) Waqf lands: "Land dedicated to God" or land held in perpetuity with the income devoted
to the upkeep of a charity or the family of the constituter of the Waqf. However, in Islam
only Mulk land and not Miri land could be transferred into Waqf land.
4) Mawat lands: "Dead land" or unoccupied land which has not been left for public use.
This part includes land lying outside the confines of villages and cultivated areas.
According to the Islamic doctrine any Muslim has access to Mawat land if he reclaims it.
5) Matrukah lands: "Abandoned land" derived from Mulk, Miri, or Mawat land and was
reserved for public purposes.
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In summary, the code replaced the communal system of ownership by private and
state holdings. Further, the communal land of a village was not fully granted to all the
inhabitant in spite of Article 8 of the code:
"A town cannot be granted in its entirety to all of the inhabitants, not
to one or two persons among them.. .separate pieces are granted to each
inhabitant and a title deed is given to each showing his right of
possession"
(Sluglett in Khalidi: 413)
Traditionally, the town was owned collectively and access to agricultural land was
restricted to the inhabitants of the village. Virtually, these lands could never be sold or
leased to outsiders and, therefore, feudal and rich peasants could not acquire them. The fact
that the article did not allow land to be granted to all peasants in the same village opened the
door to local authorities, feudal, and established families from outside to benefit from the
process of privatization. From the point of view of the Ottoman state the code was seen as a
revenue-raising device, further it gave rights to peasants to hold land titles in their villages
so as to restrain them from migration and to encourage agricultural exploitation for taxation.
Thus, large tracts of land passed into private hands not necessarily the poor. Two
shortcomings of the code can be traced in this sense. (a) In times of falling agricultural
prices, the poor peasant, who could not increase his production and thereby his revenues
because of the lack of means and high tax rates, was forced to resort to moneylenders or
rich merchants of Beirut to pay taxes. (b) The high interests charged on the peasant made
him gradually economically and politically dependent on his creditor who could take over
the peasant's title at a later stage. As a result, the Ottoman's strategies to give social stability
to the poor by granting land titles soon collapsed. The severe economic conditions, which
prevailed during the second half of the 19th century, forced these poor to give up their titles
to a rising bourgeoisie. This process is neatly described by Baer (1982: 94-100):
"Merchants and money lenders gradually made themselves masters of newly emerging
commercial activities of the peasants and became owners of their land. One of the reasons
for this process was the fact that impoverished peasants could not leave their village to
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seek a living in town because by 1860 industrial production was sharply declining and the
peasant was forced to hang on to his farm, thus falling a prey to the usurers."
In broad outline, the principal changes which occurred to the structure of land
tenure during this period are summarized by Charles Issawi:-"the communal or tribal forms
of land tenure that prevailed in most of the regions were slowly replaced by private
ownership and subsistence farming gave way to production for the market" (1982:4). In
Lebanon, two form of tenure developed as a result of the 1858 land code. One was
absentee landlordism, where properties were cultivated by peasants whose ancestors used
to hold usufructuary rights it, due to the privatization of Mushaa and the other was the
introduction of the land registry which facilitated land transactions and, therefore allowed
small title holders to sell their properties to outsiders of the community.
1.4 Lebanon after the 1862 Protocol
The application of the 1858 land code was not enough to stop the continuing strife
in Lebanon, between the Druze and the Maronites and between the poor and their lords
since 1821. Pressure from France and Britain forced the Ottoman state to undertake major
reforms to rehabilitate the political system while particularly preserving the rights of the
Maronites. These political reforms made Lebanon an autonomous province in the Ottoman
Empire and "brought equality of all sects and groups of people before the law" (Baaklini,
1976: 44). The head of the new province, who formerly was always a Muslim, became a
Christian Ottoman assisted by an elected council (Central Administrative Council, or CAC)
the twelve delegates of which represented the various sects and ethnic groups of Lebanon.
Each village would choose a leader who in turn elected the CAC members in accordance
with a sectarian distribution1 .The creation of this institution has institutionalized the conflict
1 The CAC is constituted of: 4 Maronites, 2 Greek Orthodox, 1 Greek Catholic, 1 Sunni, 1 Shiite, and
3 Druzes.
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in Lebanon between the various religious communities and permitted the waning feudal
system to reestablish itself through new forms of governance.
"The CAC was entrusted with the assessment, distribution, and control
of taxes.. .was empowered to administer government properties and the
revenues derived from them. Finally, the CAC was entrusted with the
supervision of State land."
(Baaklini, 1976:5 1).
Through the work of the CAC the aristocracy of Lebanon was protected from
liquidation. Gradually this aristocracy turned its attention to commerce, trade, silk
industry, and education a a means to preserve its economic lead and its power. By the end
of the 19th century the Lebanese aristocracy (ex-feudal) rehabilitated itself and continued to
play an active political role and, therefore, influence legislations to serve their interests
based upon new economic sources.
To balance between maintaining the old aristocracy and serving the poor, the CAC
created a complete cadastrel for all the Lebanon to determine land titles and settle the
conflict over the peasant-confiscated lands by moneylenders. While Mulk properties were
presumably registered adequately in the cadastre in some form or another, Miri is much
less a positive description of the status than a blanket term to cover lands on which tax is
due, and which are not defined as Mulk ,Waqf, or Miri . This process allowed the rising
bourgeoisie and new aristocracy to infiltrate the rural land market and perhaps reacquire
properties they lost during the revolt. As pylons of the province's economy, the new elites
used power and influence over the new institutions to alienate properties granted to the poor
by the cadastre. The CAC condoned the elites' practices as long as their contribution to the
economy was rendering Lebanon independent of the Empire.
1The land cadastre completed in the latter part of the nineteenth century was to remain the basis of land
title until the mid-twentieth century when the government decided to reconfirm land title by undertaking
a new land cadastre. In the new survey, claims for land title remained, nonetheless, the records worked
out by the CAC (Baaklini, 1976: 50).
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To compensate the poor, the CAC provided long term land leases (99 years) for
Miri land. As land became scarce the province authorities were skeptical in issuing leases at
low rates. Further, "The scarcity of cultivable lands made law courts limit leases to seven
terms each corresponding to three years" (Rafeq, cited in Khalidi; 1984: 380). Rich
peasants, elites, and landless poor started to compete over leases by paying key money to
local administrators, thus making the competition unfair for the poor, who theoretically
were given access to these lands as a means to help them obtain a form of social stability
and overcome the economic pressure in the Empire.
In summary, the CAC attempted to institutionalize the Lebanese political
complexities and create governmental apparatuses to administrate the country as the
Ottoman sovereignty started to enter its twighlight. Their attempts succeeded on the political
level but collapsed on the social side. They compromised between political stability and
economic independence on one side and the rights of the poor to public land on the other.
The introduction of institutional organizations administered by elites and the aristocracy
permitted these groups to manipulate the CAC's legislation to maximize their benefits. As
the agricultural economy was yielding lower revenues on the macro level by the turn of the
century, the landless peasants, lacking all forms of social stability as well as access to land,
migrated to urban centers to seek jobs in the industrial sector controlled by their former
feudal rulers.
As mentioned earlier, merchants and money lenders became de-facto landed elites
and possessed large domains in the suburban and rural areas. "The dominant families were
becoming functionally independent lords running estate properties in which they have
amounted to a virtual monopoly over both land and labor" (Khalidi, 1984: 415).
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1.5 Final remarks
The Ottoman, with good intentions, granted each inhabitant of a village part of the
collective land controlled by his community. The process, which forced individuals to
claim rights over lands which were already theirs, had two goals: (a) It tried to sustain the
poor's living conditions by giving them land on an individual basis. (b) The Ottoman
wanted to iestrain the poor from migration and, therefore, secure taxes from the new
category of landowner peasants. This process, in my perspective, failed for two reasons.
First, theoretically the poor were given titles but were also overloaded with
obligations on their properties. These properties became soon a burden to the poor in the
absence of a support system from the state, which relied on the existing feudal hierarchy to
administer the country. Eventually, it resulted in the transfer of these properties to
individuals who could overcome regulations by using position, power, and money.
Second, the state interest in securing revenues regardless of the source made
possible the acquisition of the poor's properties by the rich who could either cooperate or
shoulder the obligations imposed on agricultural properties.
Finally, granting titles to the poor without providing a cohesive system of support
created more distortion in the social hierarchy as has been the case during the
implementation of the 1858 Ottoman land code. Due to this code, rich peasants and
absentee landlords expanded their wealth and control over lands which they, previously,
had no access to . The analysis of the Ottoman period helps us understand the nature of
land relations in the Lebanese context. It, further, provides future insights on the
implications generated when the state grants land to illegitimate settlers without the
provision of a comprehensive support system, which can help them respond to the
obligations associated with land titles.
THE FRENCH MANDATE; FROM 1919 TO 1943
2.1 Greater Lebanon and the new political order
After the withdrawal of the Ottoman army in 1919, the Central Administrative
Council administered Lebanon during the transitional period between Ottoman and French
rules. After establishing the Mandate the same year, the Lebanese were divided into three
groups with regard to the future of the country. One, supported by Muslims and some
Greek Orthodox, advocated an Arab state. The second called for the establishment of
Greater Syria, which includes Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria, and was advocated by
secular intellectual elements. The third group included the Christian Maronites and the old
leadership of the province of Lebanon who envisioned an independent Lebanon including
not only the area occupied by the Province, but also, the costal strips in the North and
South as well as the Beqaa valley in the East. The French terminated the role of the CAC
because some of its members became sympathetic for establishing Greater Syria and
replaced it with an advisory council to assist the French governor understanding the
complexities of the society (Baaklini, 1976: Ch. 1-2, passim).
As representatives of the developed world and to avoid socio-political problems
generated by Ottoman practices, the French decided to manage Lebanon through the
establishment of secular institutions, the first being the Advisory Council, in order to
dissipate the sectarian and tribal affiliation of the people. This council acted as the sole
representative of the Lebanese people until the amendment of the 1926 constitution.
"The 1926 Constitution consisted of one hundred and two articles under
six major headings. The first heading contained the basic definition of
the state. This section was divided into two parts, the state and its
duties, and the citizens' rights and duties...this part of the constitution
was a subject of bitter controversy..." ( Baaklini, 1976:62)
CHAPTER II1
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The adoption of this constitution created a state which coincided with the visions of
the old leadership and the Maronites who in return could benefit from a whole corps of
administrators and statesmen, who represented the aristocracy and the old leadership of the
province and were trained by the CAC to manage a future independent country. Although
these administrators were trained to manage the Lebanese complexities under a semi secular
system, they did not enlarge their responsibilities towards new ethnicities associated with
the Greater Lebanon. On the contrary, they were still operating under the narrow scope of
tribe and religious affiliation, which restricted their interests to the area covered by the
previous province.
In summary, I can say that the French had two obstacles before building the state:
(a) One was the bias of the traditional leadership and the new aristocracy towards specific
regions and classes, which threatened the integrity of the political stability and predicted
future civil strife. (b) The second was the failure of Ottoman policies in granting land to the
poor without a support system to help them maintain this ownership. To overcome these
obstacles, the French introduced secular institutions to provide social stability for the poor
on the basis of equity and justice upon all sects and groups.
2.2 The French administrative reformsi
The French started to reform the political structure by dividing Lebanon into five
administrative regions [Beirut, Mount Lebanon, the South, the North, and the Beqaa]. In
Beirut, they exchanged the Advisory Council with a Chamber of Representatives 2 directly
elected by the people. The representatives elected the President who in return appointed the
Prime Minister. The latter selected the members of the central government on the basis of
1 The information in this section are derived from interviews with Planners and politicians in Beirut.
2 The representatives belonged to all sects and groups. The Chamber was constituted of religious
compartments which were distributed according to the size of the communities.
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their religious affiliation and political background, thus using the old leadership and
aristocracy of each sect to participate in the political arena and manage the state. In each
district the central government directly appointed a governor who supervised a district
council elected by local mayors. This council neither had a legislative power nor the means
to undertake regional development without the consensus and the financial assistance of the
central administration. On the micro level the French formed municipalities to every 2000
residents and transferred the control of public lands, which were located within their
cadastral limits, to their control. The municipal system aimed at providing the poor better
living conditions, by offering public support and access to municipal land, without granting
titles deeds to prevent the poor, in future, from selling these lands under economic
pressure.
While all land was institutionalized, the application of the municipal system varied
from one region to another. For instance, in some rural areas the municipality encompassed
many villages (between 4 and 15) where inhabitants did not have similar political opinions
or religious affiliations. Therefore, the French avoided the dominance of one community
over the others by distributing the seats of the municipal council equally among the various
groups. However, the mayor still belonged to the largest community. The members of the
council used position and access to resources to benefit the key persons of their community
and to insure their reelection. The poor, unorganized and unrepresented, became
independent of the political system, thus loosing the support system perceived by the
French. In other rural areas, the municipal council was monopolized by a tribe or a large
family, which restricted access to land and resources to its members or faithful followers.
In this situation, the municipality protected the interests of that family vis-a-vis the district
governor who condoned their dominance in return for their support. This family based
municipality took in charge the establishment of order and political stability within their
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cadastral limits. However, it has been reported that troubled relations between the district
governor and rural municipalities had resulted in the privatization of public land by the
municipal council as a sign of protest against the governor.
In urban cosmopolitan societies, the municipalities offered the opportunity to enter
the political arena, thus creating a sense of competition among mayoral candidates, which
made the role of the municipality more politically oriented than a regulator of supporting
systems for the urban poor. Thus, the inhabitants, for their part, considered that the
collective lands, which were transferred to public and private properties by the Ottoman
land code, were returned to the community belongings. Therefore, in many villages the
municipality was not considered as a governmental body. The elites, on the other side,
relied on a rising professional class to carry-out the state's needs and goals for urban
development based upon recent technologies.
In broad outline, the municipal system affected land tenure in two ways. First, the
municipal council, as a governmental body, owned state lands registered under the 1858
land code. Unfortunately, the structure of the municipal system ended up serving selected
features of the community and neglected the poor's rights to use these lands. Second, the
responsibility of collecting taxes was transferred from outsider tax bidders to municipal
councils. However, the cancellation of agricultural and property taxes, which were
considered as sources of injustice, obliged the municipalities to depend on other sources of
revenues; namely, by imposing additional charges on infrastructure, services, and
construction permits and by leasing municipal land for agricultural, commercial, or
industrial use.
In Mount-Lebanon and around Beirut, part of the state land was already leased
since the Ottoman period. The transfer of ownership motivated the municipalities to update
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the term of the leases through imposing higher rates and reducing the terms from 99 years
to a yearly basis. These innovations enabled the municipalities to increase their revenues on
a yearly basis, to conform with the current monetary system, and to provide equal chances
to the poor to access land. The lessees rejected the modification on lease terms for two
reasons. (1) The intentions of the municipal council towards serving the poor were untrue.
They intended to increase their power and control by leasing these lands to supporters. (2)
The change of the lease terms brought to an end their rights to access public land, especially
that these rights had been originally offered by the CAC to compensate their loss of titles
deeds derived from collective properties. The municipalities referred to law courts to
resolve the conflict. However, they were ordered by the central authorities to confine to
their role in helping the poor and not gentrifying public lands. Hence, the municipalities
released two leases; one for the old tenants similar to the original lease, and the other an
updated version to new tenants. However, one clause was added to the original form in
which the lease is terminated after the death of the lessee, nevertheless, his family could
lease the land, but only under the new regulations.
2,3 French attempts to rationalize planning
In the early thirties, the French realized that administrative reforms are not sufficient
to implement the aspired support system for the poor. The weakness of annual taxes on
farm products and on land necessitated the creation of an alternative source for public
revenues. Therefore, they sought to rationalize planning by defining land uses and forcing
development into more dynamic directions. To implement its strategies for development the
Mandate authorities conducted a new cadastral and population surveys in 1932. The intent
was to regularize the land market, update the 1858 land register, and prepare the required
data to design a master plan, which would organize the present development of Beirut and
forecast its future growth. The plan was proposed by Mr. Danger, a French planner:
"The Danger Plan prepared in 1932 was based on geographic,
climatic, geological, and population studies of Municipal Beirut.
The broad lines of the plan embraced major improvements to three
main traffic arteries, the Tripoli, Damascus and Saida roads, and
featured several proposed new roads and by-passes. Significantly,
Mr Danger, 36 years ago, stressed the necessity to deal with Beirut
and its surrounding communities as one unit. His recommendations
concerned the protection of high areas, measures to be taken against
drifting sand, the development of public gardens, the building of
sanitary sewers, the organization of a refuse collection and disposal
system, and a slum clearance program."
(Comprehensive Plan Studies For The City of Beirut, 1968: 5)
Implicitly, the plan motivated Beirut's authorities to think of the periphery as a
future unit of the city, thus encouraging Beirut and Mount Lebanon authorities to mitigate
and resolve conflict over municipal lands before further complexities were created. Mr.
Danger classified the periphery of East Beirut as high density zone, mainly due to the
presence of Armenian refugee camps and slums of poor peasants who settled in Beirut to
work in the industrial sector. Along the Western littoral he suggested the development of
luxurious resorts for high income groups to generate high revenues and, therefore,
subsidize both the upgrading of infrastructure and slums clearance programs of East Beirut.
The cadastre revealed large tracts of vacant lands along the periphery and without
inheritors, which constituted a problem to Mr Danger who proposed to use them for public
benefit. The French governor, however, seized the opportunity to win the support of
religious institutions by distributing these properties equally among them. Such a policy
has not only reinforced the position of religious institutions over municipalities and public
authorities, but also introduced them into the land marketl.
Unfortunately, landed elites and traditional leaders manipulated the French survey
to rationalize land for their personal benefits. Interviews with municipal heads revealed that
areas which did not have a clear tenure status and were neither claimed by the municipality,
1 Information obtained during an interview with Dr. El-Jouzou, Mufti of Mount Lebanon district.
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nor the residents or the Awqaf were registered as private holdings and therefore taken out
of the market for purpose of future speculation. Further, the intervention of the Governor
in distributing land rendered the Master Plan worthless prior to its implementation. The
consequences of the land survey had worsened the land situation as did the administrative
reforms (i.e.creation of municipalities). This situation was best described by Michael
Gilsenanl:
"When the French instituted a Cadastral survey in order to rationalize land ownership
(from their point of view), regulate private property in land, and aid in the creation of
an independent landholding peasantry as the motor of agricultural change and progress
it was actually the lords who benefited. Collective holdings and rights were indeed
fragmented, and often acquired by the Beys..."
2.4 Failure of the French reforms
The creation of the greater Lebanon expanded the system of domination of elitist
classes in ways that were in direct contradiction to French ideas of necessity of radical
changes in land tenure and agriculture. This by definition entailed important political
developments. The elites possessed controlling access to the apparatuses of the new
Lebanese state. The substitution of the CAC by an elected Chamber of Representatives led
to the emergence of new leaders who confined their loyalty to religion and sect rather than
the state as a nation.
The birth of this "modern" state called for the emergence of a bureaucracy. The
alliance between the rising elite and the landed elites made enormous demands on the real-
estate economy.The elites extended their land holding beyond their local areas of influence,
which increased their political control but failed to generate the necessary revenues. Even
when development took place, it was used as as an instrument of political control. The
control of land and labor was reinforced in new ways. The landlords were able to use
1 Gilsenan Michael, Land and Labor in north Lebanon, in Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the
Middle-East,AUB press,pp.459.
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access to the state to restrict basic services in transport, communications, electricity,
education, health and water. These became "favors" personally and arbitrarily awarded
through the increasingly elaborate networks of patron client relationships. Through this
system, the elites succeeded in operating within the full complexities of both the modem
state and traditional forms of domination. The inability of the peasantry to reclaim
agricultural land was caused by the low revenues the agricultural sector yielded as the
economy was shifting towards tourism and services (Baaklini, 1976: ch.3-4, passim and
Barakat, 1977: ch.6-8, passim).
2.5 Conclusive remarks
As described earlier, the French administratives reforms could not overcome the
political rivalries and the sectarian bias of the officials and leaders within Greater Lebanon,
thus widening the disparities between the poor and the state. Access to land by the poor
was constrained by many factors: (1) The availability of capital to cover front end
expenditures for leasing municipal lands. (2) The political and religious affiliation of the
individual in question. Consequently, the French incentives to bring reforms in land tenure
have collapsed for several reasons:
First, the majority of municipalities were headed by established families which enabled
them to monopolize the use of public lands for political and financial interests
Second, the government embarked in large urbanization and modernization projects in the
capital, which required massive unskilled and low wage labor. Meanwhile, the agricultural
sector was yielding lower and lower revenues which forced many peasants to terminate
their leases and migrate towards Beirut seeking better living conditions. Consequently, the
French strategies to establish a support system for peasants, which they were advocating
instead of granting land titles, collapsed.
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Third, the failure of the French to dissipate the political and religious conflicts within the
new institutions resulted in a system in which traditional leaders and technocrats competed
over power and resources and turned a deaf ear to the poor's rights for access to land. On
the long run the French strategies proved to alienate land access and resources to the
traditional elements of the former feudal system.
Fourth, on the macro level the new institutions relied extensively on the politicians and
intellectuals who transferred their contradictions and rivalries from the provincial level to
the state level, thus, creating disparities not only between the poor and the state but also
between the different regions.
Fifth, the overlap between the municipal system of land control and the CAC leases
generated conflicts between original tenants and the municipality. More importantly, this
conflict caused the tenants to question the validity of new leases if the system was to
change in the future (i.e.; after independence). For instance, municipal councils around
Beirut considered the end of the Ottoman rule a termination of the lease term and, therefore,
sold municipal properties to influential leaders. Subsequently, many tenants became illegals
and considered by the law as invaders of private properties.
Sixth, the central government was based upon religious compartments. Government
officials did not scrutinize the national responsibilities they had to carry out. On the
contrary, they operated within the narrow scope of tribe and religion. The implication of
officials' attitude was clear in the case of the Ouzai corridor1 . The Christian dominated
central authority was uninterested in resolving the dispute, which generated due to the
change of lease terms, over property rights in the Ouzai corridor, because The area was
historically and predominantly a Muslim neighborhood.
Finally, the support system advocated by the French has failed when applied
independently from its socio-political context. The Ottoman, who ruled Lebanon for five
1 The case of the Ouzai corridor will be analyzed in chapter VI.
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centuries, succeeded better in understanding the Lebanese complexities. Naively, the
French imposed a secular system based upon religious compartments, in order to abolish
sectarianism. This and other controversies distinguished the period of the French Mandate
and created a sense of skepticism and uncertainty at the lower levels towards the role of
urbanization and modernization in providing the poor with social stability and access to
land at affordable rates.
THE POST INDEPENDENCE ERA: 1943 TO 1974
3.1 Political development in modem Lebanon
After independence the French-created Chamber of Representatives became the
legislative body of Lebanon, while the President and the Council of Ministers became the
executive power. These authorities were forced to find an alternative to the French
apparatuses which used to supervise and direct public services. Therefore, they formed a
civil service cadre to fulfill the demand for public staffing and supervise the implementation
of planning adequately in the five Lebanese districtsl.
The civil service conditions in the early years of independence period were much
affected by the political atmosphere in the country, which was, on the one hand, a
victorious feeling of satisfaction for the attainment of national liberation and, on the other, a
cautious attitude toward consolidating internal unity among the Lebanese.
In view of these internal conditions, the ruling authorities tried to handle personnel
and other administrative functions on personal basis and through a confessional
understanding, extending favors and attracting new supporters for the regime, thus,
transferring political rivalries and sectarianism to the various domain of the state. Further,
the creation of job opportunities in the public sector allowed politicians to exercise influence
in the employment process and to undermine concepts of competence and administrative
needs.
Until 1959, there was no central personnel department to control and coordinate
development. Nepotism in the appointment of civil servants and laxity in th enforcement of
1 The information in this chapter about the development of public services have been derived from "The
Civil Service Reforms in Lebanon" by Bashir, 1977.
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laws and regulations became normal practice. These conditions were expressed in
statements by members of the opposition, who accused the existing political regime at that
time of turning the state into a private firml. In 1958, the regime of president Cham'oun
concentrated on up-dating personnel regulations, introducing the system of examination
restricting promotion to the higher grades from within, specifying cadres, and adjusting
salaries. These were all significant achievements, but attempts to install machinery which
would insure the proper application of laws and regulations and be independent of political
influence were unsuccessful. The civil strife of 1958, which marked the end of
Cham'oun's term, reflected the level of public frustration from the practice imposed on
public institutions.
President Chehab, assuming office in September 22, 1958, thought of trying to
divert the attention of the Lebanese from political issues by initiating an ambitious and
comprehensive governmental reform program, encompassing administrative, social, and
economic endeavors. His motive was to build "State of the Independence". These
measures, along with the wide public confidence placed in the new president, undoubtedly
helped the country to return to normalcy in a short period of time. He created the Central
Committee for administrative reform which conducted its work by dividing itself into seven
preparatory committees. Each preparatory committee was in charge of a certain area, and it
was entitled to utilize the services of professional persons organized in a task force to help
in research and drafting of the legislative decree projects. The task force was theoretically
rational and not influenceable by traditional elements of the Lebanese politics. The outcome
of that committee predicted a new era where equity and justice for the poor were
maintained. Unfortunately, rational planning was constantly opposed by the traditional
elites who mobilized the aristocracy and the established elites against income and land
1 For an elaborate account of these developments see issues of the daily news-papers An-Nahar, Al-
Amal, and Telegraph published during the summer of 1952.
Land conflicts in Beirut 29
redistribution. The general feeling was that rational planning threatened the integrity of
ruling classes in Lebanon.
Parallel to the administrative reorganization movement, the regime of president
Chehab launched another attempt in the areas of social and economic planning. A French
consultant firm, IRFED1 , was contracted in 1959 to undertake research for the Lebanese
government on social and economic conditions.
Later, it has become a tradition in Lebanon that with the beginning of a new
presidential term of office every six years, the administration must undertake a review of
governmental operations. This began before the establishment of the Civil Service Board
and continued, in different styles, under the subsequent regimes. The administrative reform
program, which was launched by president Charles Helou in 1966, centered on eliminating
corruption in the administration through taking purgative measures against corruption. The
general feeling of dissatisfaction held by the citizens towards the prevailing corruption in
the administration, similar sentiment shared also by the newly elected President, helped the
new regime to obtain a legislative mandate for carrying out the intended reform program.
Unfortunately, the strong alliance between the traditional leadership and the private sector
accentuated the degree of corruption inside the executive apparatuses and influenced the
legislative decree projects.
On February 16, 1974, the Council of Ministers, influenced by the increasing
demands of Muslims for better representation in the types of positions in the public sector,
launched a comprehensive transfer program of employees in Grade I. The program was to
relax the sectarianism of the individual post and to rotate positions held by Christians with
those of Muslims. Reform steps were later halted due to the emergence of serious political
1 Institut de Recherches et de Formation en Vue de Developpement.
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issues, which finally led to the widespread of the civil war from February 1975 until the
writing of this study. Today the major demand of the Muslim communities is the
elimination of sectarianism not only from the civil service but also from the entire
governmental system. This demand is still, however, opposed by the traditional Maronites
leadership and the old aristocracy because this process will disadvantage their position in
the decision making since independence. Nevertheless, the unprivileged communities of
Lebanon have not only increased tremendously in size but also trained qualified
professionals and politicians to better represent them in the future state.
3.2 The Lebanese economic policies
Until 1974, Lebanese economic policyl had two main and related objectives: (a) To
maintain relative financial stability. (b) To support the economic efforts of the private sector
and provide it with opportunity to exercise the major influence on the rate and pattern of
economic expansion.
The first objective was achieved (at least up to 1971). Lebanon's external economic
policies, based on a simple exchange system characterized by the absence of restrictions on
current payments, capital transfers, and a flexible exchange rate had, in large measure,
helped maintain financial stability and generate a strong balance of payments performance,
particularly since the authorities had adhered to cautious fiscal-monetary policies.
The second objective was served by the concentration of authorities largely on the
building of the country's infrastructure and by their limiting the growth in the direct
participation of the public sector in the national economy. While the role of governmental
policy had grown it did not exercise a decisive influence on the rate and pattern of private
1 For further information about the Lebanese economic policy refer to "Financial Policy and Economic
Growth: The Lebanese Experience". Makdissi, 1979, part I: 30.
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domestic expansion. This is not surprising since the public sector did not have well-defined
socio-economic goals. Its role in the social field, while existent, appeared to be achieved by
ad-hoc actions. Instead of leading, the public sector was led by evolving domestic
pressures.
The government's policy decisions towards the private sector were not governed by
well-defined criteria, except perhaps for the belief that financial stability was a companion
for private initiative and was beneficial for the country as a whole. Judging by actual
policies, governmental support for private initiative took two main forms: the building of
the country's infrastructure, and the nonhindering of private enterprise except in relatively
few areas which were reserved for public sector operation (e.g. public utilities and tobacco
marketing). Regulatory mechanisms were enforced in respect of several economic activities
(rent control, prices of certain basic foodstuffs, tobacco production, transportation fees,
etc.) and direct public participation included irrigation works and other projects. While
governmental influence was on the rise, nevertheless private enterprise remained largely
free from governmental supervision and direction. Lebanon's postwar economic growth
could indeed be mainly attributable to the efforts of the private sector. By comparison to
many other developing countries the public sector tended to expand rapidly (not necessarily
on account of economic factors) with a surge in the dominance of the governmental
policies.
3U Failure of economic policies
It is observed that Lebanese public sector did never operate within a national policy
framework. Thus, economic policies aimed at maintaining relative financial stability and
providing the private sector with the opportunity of playing the major role in economic
expansion. It was also noted that in the later years of the period under review longer-term
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developmental planning became more pronounced (i.e., Six-Year Plan 1972-1977).
However, the prevailing state of insecurity in the country prevented the implementation of
such plans. Unfortunately, the economic assumptions were too optimistic for a turbulent
environment.
The major failures1 of Lebanon's economic policy were much more manifested by
the absence of important socio-economic objectives which should have been sought than
by the record of achievement in quantitative terms, though shortcomings were also noted
here. To have avoided these failures would, of course, have demanded a radical change in
the attitudes and behaviors of the national authorities. Such a change would, in turn, have
implied an official willingness and ability to think in terms of policy coordination (i.e., in
terms of drawing up national targets - both external and internal) and the elaboration of
well-defined and consistent means to attain them.
3.4 Modern planning attempts
Returning back from the 1970's to the 1940's: in the mid forties, the authorities
realized the need to organize the district of Beirut. The update of the Danger Plan was
carried out by Mr. Ecochard2 in 1944.
"The plan was based on exhaustive studies embracing Greater Beirut
from Nahr el Maout to Ouzai. The studies included all utilities and were
based on population statistics and estimated suburban expansion.
Details of the proposed road network were also included. Treating Beirut
as part of a region provided a certain degree of comprehensive planning.
Popular housing, and extensions of the industrial area were proposed. A
zoning law divided the city into 12 areas, commercial, industrial and
residential sections of different densities".
(Comprehensive Plan Studies For The City of Beirut, 1968: 5)
1 Ibid. Chapter: 6-8, passim.
2 French planner hired in the early forties to organize Beirut. His plan is referred to as "Plan Ecochard".
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According to his plan, Ecochard proposed the allocation of Beirut International
Airport and the creation of a new town along the Western littoral of Beirut. The proposed
road network linking Beirut to its periphery increased speculation on land since all
properties would become accessible by the modern modes of transportation. Ecochard's
propositions affected to a great extend the use of the fringe. Elite classes, with access to
state intentions for development, had a better understanding of the Plan repercussions than
low income groups and slum dwellers in the East part of Beirut. A high official of the
National Planning Boardi, who was a fresh graduate at this period, mentioned that for a
decade the elites attempted unsuccessfully to influence decision makers to enact repressive
zoning regulations. These regulations were meant to force residents with long term leases
to leave and owners of properties below the stanuard size to sell. Further, they included
high fees on construction permits, low Floor Area Ratio (F.A.R.) and allowable built up
area, and the use of specific finishing to create a certain character for the area.
In 1950 the state benefited enough from the economic prosperity of the country to
accumulate the required capital to undertake urban development projects in the metropolitan
area. Yet, the Ecochard plan needed updating to conform with the rapid growth of the city.
Egli, another French planner, presented a report based on the recommendations of
Ecochard.
"The Egli Report prepared in 1950 was an appraisal and proposed
revision of the Ecochard Plan, with special reference to previous road
proposals of Ecochard. It adopted most of the main roads proposed by
Ecochard but moved the commercial ring southwards. A new zoning
law dividing the city into 5 areas was proposed. This report formed the
basis for further studies which resulted in the General Master Plan -
now in application".
(Comprehensive Plan Studies For The City of Beirut, 1968: 5)
Egli zoned the Western littoral for luxurious residential areas bounded by large
public complexes [Sporting City, Golf Club, and the airport]. The similarity between Egli's
1 The official insisted on keeping his name anonymous for administrative purposes.
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and Ecochard's recommendations enforced the convictions of the elites, who could foresee
the effects of such a plan, towards the future of Beirut. In the mid fifties the state adopted
the General Master Plan which was prepared by a special committee studying earlier
planning proposals:
"The General Master Plan examined earlier schemes of the (Plan
Directeur and develop a unified plan of public improvements within
the limited financial capabilities of the Municipality. The resulting
recommendations were confined to major roads and their connections to
Beirut's approaches. Detailed planning proposals were omitted as two
important elements of a Master Plan: provision of open spaces and the
siting of public buildings... In 1954, a building and zoning code was
prepared; and after discussion and modification, was adopted..."
(Comprehensive Plan Studies For The City of Beirut, 1968: 5)
The thriving Lebanese economy supported by a strong private sector, flow of
foreign capital, and confidence in the monetary system encouraged the state in embarking
into extensive urban development projects in and around Beirut. By the late fifties the
airport and the Sporting City were constructed and luxurious residential quarters appeared
along the airport boulevard (see map). The rising importance of West Beirut and its littoral
increased the competition over land. The building boom encouraged speculation through
which the elites, the poor, and the municipalities wanted to share its fruits. In 1963, the
IRFED mission published a report concerning the social, economical, and physical aspects
of the country. It was an epoch making document for Lebanon and paved the way for the
development of the period which followed. The IRFED study revealed that most of the
slum dwellers were Muslims,who migrated from unprivileged regions of Lebanon, and that
was widening the disparity not only between the rich and the poor but also between the two
religious communities
The IRFED report influenced the " Plan Directeur de Beyrouth et de sa Banlieue"
which was prepared in 1963 and parts of it ratified in 1964. This plan, prepared by Mr.
Ecochard in cooperation with a team of local architects, was based on the recommendations
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of the IRFED Mission, namely the suggested zoning and area classification codes. The
report urged the authorities to resolve the conflict over the Ouzai area as land invasion and
illegal invasions had been intensifying since 1958. The major guidelines of the report were:
"A tremendous amount of work has gone into the preparation of the
regional highway network. Provision for through traffic in the region is
one of the assets of the plan - a feature which is in harmony with
highway planning and design. Broadly, the suburbs of Beirut are divided
into main zones: A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, E-1, E-2, D, and G of which the
first is strictly residential the second and third are residential with some
light industry and commerce and the last are strictly industrial".
(Comprehensive Plan Studies For The City of Beirut, 1968: 6)
The zoning of Beirut was influenced by the rising need to expend the urban
development of the Capital. Further, the plan did not take into account the provision of land
for the poor or even the traditional claims over the lands, the current realities, and the
ongoing conflicts over land control. These aspects prevented the plan from conforming to
reality and therefore led it to fail before being amended. A former general director of state
budgeting, Mr. Mohamad-Ali Itani, stated that "the adoption of the zoning regulation
characterized the area with illegal developments. The historical eventsi, previously stated,
provided the poor with excuses to invade land which zoning classified it for luxurious
housing and, therefore, made it valuable". In summary, the Executive Board of Major
Projects reported in 1968 that:
" Locating of refugee and workers camps in low lying properties in the
city and its suburbs has created major problems of environmental
sanitation ad congestion which could have been avoided had land use
controls been developed and enforced during the past twenty years. Now
it is necessary to provide planning and programing solutions to the
existing conditions, particularly housing, at great cost and serious
social disruption..."
(Comprehensive Plan Studies For The City of Beirut, 1968: 17)
1 These included: privatization of Mushaa land, distribution of land to Waqf authorities, transfer of Miri
to municipal control, and the subsequent modifications of lease terms...
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As stated, the report referred the settlement formation to the lack of rational
planning and the enforcement of the law. The report suggested the creation of public
housing as a means to halt the settlement expansion and, therefore, disregarded the effects
of land tenure in initiating the Ouzai settlements. When I asked the general director of the
national planning board, Mr. Mohamad Fawaz, about the role of planning authorities in
resolving land conflict, he stated that "The nature of our work is actually limited to the
design and upgrading of legal environments".
3.5 Effect of social pluralism, economic policies, and planning on slum formation
The social class structure in Lebanon, as indicated earlier in this study, is pyramidal
in that the great majority of the Lebanese are poor, a small portion are middle class, and
very few are ultra-rich. The government-sponsored study conducted by the IRFED Mission
revealed that 4% of the Lebanese received about one-third of the total national income in
1960. Since then constant reference has been made to the "4 percent class" ruling Lebanon
and monopolizing its wealth. Inspite of the great wealth that has been pouring into
Lebanon, rendering it the finance center of the area, prosperity has continued to be confined
to some areas and groups, and the gap between the rich and the poor has continued to
widen and deepen. Mount Lebanon and some neighborhoods in Beirut had been growing
prosperous at a much more rapid pace than the South, the North, and the Beqaa' districts.
Two poverty belts (see map of misery belts) inhabited predominantly by Muslims
emerged in Lebanon and bear evidence of the disproportion of wealth and rewards. One
belt, which contained poor migrants from the South, the Beqaa', and the North, extended
along the southern periphery and surrounded the prosperous Mount Lebanon. The
disparities are many, including the availability of schools, roads, hospitals, and other
facilities. The other belt has surrounded Beirut, for its suburbs were converted into over
Figure 4
The spread of the pre war
settlements around the city
formed the so called misery
belts. They were a mixture of
slums and Palestinian refugee
camps. Settlements 1,2,3, and
4 were in majority Palestinians
Kurds, and Syrians. While
settlements 5,6,7, and 8 are in
majority habitated by Shiites.
During the civil war all these
settlements were eradicated and
their inhabitants were displaced
to West Bierut, namely, to the
Ouzai corridor.
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crowded and poverty-stricken slum areas. A large number of young families have been
moving from villages into these neighborhoods. After, such areas as Ghobeiry, Chiah, and
an-Naba became overcrowded; quite often one single room would be inhabited by ten
persons, and swarms of children filled the narrow dirty streets. Furthermore, these
uprooted Lebanese communities found themselves close to or intermingling with the
Palestinian refugees and other disinherited and destitute groups. The disinherited found
themselves sharing the same destiny. The socio-economic disparities coincided with
religious affiliations. The fact that the bulk of the destitute were Muslims contributed to
further aggravation of religious differences and polarization of the two communities.
Further aggravation was caused by increasing inflation which hit the lower classes.
The IRFED report refers to the appalling low levels of existence in many of the
settlements1 around Beirut, a level the implications of which were to become more obvious
in the constant troubles between the poor and the state that marked the 1968 to 1973 period
especially.
3.6 Summry
In broad outline, the politicians and leaders of the post-independence era were not
on the level of managing the state of Lebanon. They turned the state of Lebanon into a
private firm, spread corruption and injustice, and manipulated public policies to the benefit
of the private sector. Unsuccessfully, the state attempted to reform its institutions which
were created by the French and blindly adopted by the successive administrations. By the
end of this era we realize that Urban land policies were a minor issue in this whole scenery
of administrative and planning reforms.
1 These areas are also called as the Misery Belt of the capital. They consist of refugee camps, squatter
settlements, and slums.
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The problems generated by public agencies such as nepotism in the civil service,
corruption, and elites' subjection of natural resources are not recent in Lebanon. The role of
traditional leadership old aristocracy has influenced the building of the nation since the late
part of the Ottoman period and, specifically, the creation of the Central Administrative
Council.
Finally, the failure of public policies and planning schemes to respond to the needs
of the poor for better living conditions made them support the opposition of each
administration. The development of slums can be perceived as an alternative solution which
the poor undertook in the absence of unbiased public policies. This absence made this part
of the society foresee land as a vehicle to force their rights for better living conditions.
THE POST 1975 ERA, THE CIVIL WAR
4.1 Effects of the war on the public sector
The post 1975 era is marked by the continuing strife between the different
communities over the control of decision making in the country. Many factors led to this
war, namely, the nepotism prevailing in the public service which expanded the power and
control of traditional leaders and old aristocracy over the state legislations, the lack of social
stability and formal access to land for the poor, the continuing suzerainty of the Maronites
over the state resources, and the growing frustration within the Muslim community towards
political representation and allocation of development projects in areas predominantly
occupied by Muslims. The war encompasses complexities and contradictions which have
been accumulating since the latter part of the Ottoman period.
The war has dramatically affected the economy, prevented legal authorities from
imposing the law, displaced communities from across the demarcation lines and
redistributed them on the basis of their sectarian affiliation, thus, creating homogeneous
societies and political entities within each of the Muslim and Christian communities. As far
as the public sector is concerned, its role became limited to maintaining the old and
overburdened infrastructure and facilitating small scale administrative services. Tax
revenues were reduced to null, which restricted the state capabilities in providing basic
support to communities in distress. Hence, many of the poor took advantage of the chaotic
situation to acquire land illegally and, therefore, force their rights for better living
conditions, rights which has been denied historically by feudal and established landed
elites. The case study in the following chapter will illustrate the invasion process and the
nature of land conflicts generated by historical claims of the setters.
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After 13 years of ongoing rounds of fights between the two sides of the Capital, the
public sector was forced to operate under two apparatuses each located in the East and the
West of Beirut. This aspect imposed a certain character on this sector. Each community
attempted to divert the state resources to its part of the country, which created more
distortion in the allocation of resources. For instance, a Shiite tribe leader from Hermell,
who lives in the illegal settlements, stated that they never felt the presence of the state since
the early sixties except for preventing the cultivation of "hashish". The total absence of the
state, since 1975, allowed many tribes to recultivate this plant together with opium. The
revenues derived from narcotic cultivations reached 20% of the total GNP by 1988 and is
threatening to multiply by ten folds by the end of this decade. Consequently, the tribe
leader pointed out that before the war politicians fought against the poor to channel national
resources into private interests, while today they are fighting each other over position and
power. Subsequently, our agrarian based economy is providing a support system to the
community which the state was not able to do during its apogee.
4.2 Economic constraints of the post war era
The attempt to assess the economic impact of this war faces at this juncture certain
important constraints, a major one being the nonavailability, as yet, of reliable estimate of
the damage which was sustained by the Lebanese economy. However, the war has
disrupted many aspects of the urban fabric. The following are the major affected domains2 :
(1)- Severe and widespread damage to physical assets and, therefore, to existing capacities
of production, (e.g., damage to farms, business establishments, public utilities, etc...).
(2)-Drop in the national income owing to damage of physical capacity, disruption of the
transportation network of the domestic and the foreign trade channels, the departure of
1 Hermel is a Shiites county west of Beqaa district, its residents and the local tribes have since a long
time complained against the absence of the state to urbanize the area.
2 Samir Makdissi, Financial policy and economic growth, the Lebanese experience, 1979: 125... 130.
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business firms and capital, and reduced governmental and private expenditures.
(3)- Drop in the level of employment which, however, did not imply a rise in the level in
domestic unemployment. That is, unemployment caused by the damage of the production
capacity, the disruption or closure of businesses and the reduced stream of expenditure
should be balanced by the exodus of the labor force from Lebanon (basically non-skilled or
semi-skilled non-Lebanese labor and both Lebanese and non-Lebanese skilled labor and
professionals) and rising employment in the various military-political organizations. As a
result to the exodus, the remittances of the Shiites expatriates will serve funding the
development of illegal settlements.
(4)- Adverse intangibles, in particular: loss of confidence on the part of the private sector,
loss of human resources and change of distribution (at least temporarily) of asset holdings
as a result of physical destruction and/or pillage.
(5)-Adverse financial development manifested in increased inflationary pressures,
temporary closure of banks and the narrowing of the banking sector, the narrowing of the
exchange market and its partial fragmentation as a result of the de-facto partitioning on the
country, the emergence of entangled debt problems and creditor-debtor relationships
including the disruption of credit facilities, and the reduction of the central bank activity to a
minimum level.
(6)-The rupture of the administrative setup. It is noteworthy that the Ministry of Finance
continued to make payments (with some delay) to governmental employees and to members
of the Lebanese armed forces, though the army has split up. In practice ministries and
public bodies ceased to function as unified organs. They were partly replaced by local
bodies which made of certain existing governmental apparatus and whenever possible, of
governmental personnel. In the West sector, the governmental apparatus was apparently
Islamicly oriented, as was the case with Christians in the Eastern side. It facilitated the
provision of services to illegal settlements as a compensation to the losses refugees
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encountered through forced displacement. This practice was perceived as an informal
approval by the government to settlements formation.
(7)- The forced movement of groups of people from their traditional districts of residence to
other districts in the country as a result of the war. This movement has not only intensified
the problem of housing, but also created an additional social problem of immediate socio-
political consequences. The first is the illegal acquisition of private and public properties.
The displaced groups from East Beirut to its West were more fortunate than vice-versa. The
availability of vacant land in the Ouzai corridor helped the to resettle those of the East,
while the displaced Christians were unprivileged with their relocation in the East sector as
vacant lands were not available in tracts which permit the relocation of large masses.
4.3 The creation of the Council for Development and Reconstruction-CDR 1:
Two major obstacles were facing the state in the post war era before undertaking
development and reconstruction: One is the lack of consensus on fundamental issues and
particularly on the national identity of Lebanon (whether it should be linked to the free
world or to the Arab League). Second is the loyalty of the Lebanese to their sectarian,
kinship, and local communities rather than to the country as a whole.
To overcome these obstacles the state created in 1977 a new governmental body,
the CDR 2 , different in structure from regular public institutions. The CDR launched
Lebanon's first reconstruction plan which envisaged the expenditure of LL 20 billion over
an 8-year period in order to overcome the ravages and destruction resulting from the
hostilities of 1975-76. In February 1983, the CDR prepared a new and revised construction
1 The information about the CDR are derived from interviews with officials in the council, and a report
on "The Reconstruction of Beirut" by the Middle East Economic Consultant, June 1985.
2 Council for Development and Reconstruction: this council was created in 1977 to undertake major
reconstruction and development projects on the national level. Its role was to propose conceptual
guidelines for urbanization in order to meet the needs of unprivileged groups in the rural areas.
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plan which took account of the additional and considerable damages and destruction due to
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon during the summer of 1982. The implementation of this
revised plan was put back by the renewed fighting in various parts of Lebanon in the
second half of 1983..
On the overall, the reconstruction plan contains a cost analysis for rehabilitating the
housing stock. Unfortunately, the provision of new dwellings was tied to the general
reconstruction framework, which made impossible the implementation phase without a
national "entente", especially that the plan is developed around the CBD. Consequently, the
persisting delay in rehabilitating the damaged structures and the provision of new
dwellings, or compensation, to displaced groups left the housing market to the private
initiatives. After each round of fighting, people reconstructed their residence using private
sources.
Its establishment was for the purpose of planning and guiding the future
reconstruction and growth of the national economy. This board was expected to influence
to a large extent the type and character of Lebanon's development path, addressing itself, as
it should, not only to the technical problems of planning but to various socio-economic
issues facing the country.
Thus, linking the housing program to the reconstruction plan showed inefficiency
in coping with the present demand. Moreover, private initiatives were not taken into
consideration to reduce the costs of housing suggested by the plan. Yet, the CDR officials
did not propose any policies to lower the real cost of construction through the control of
building materials and land prices, nor to adjust building regulation to fit the financial
capabilities of the poor.
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On the economic level the CDR had to deal with issues related to debtor creditor
relationships. How should they be regulated, particularly as concerning outstanding debts
during the period of the war? At the government level, what size of current budget can be
contemplated with or without foreign aid? Given shortfalls in revenues, to what extent can
the authorities resort to deficit financing to cover expenditures?
On the development level the CDR considered new approaches to undertake urban
and regional development, upgrade existing infrastructure, and provide resources on an
equity basis. It dealt with issues related to the state role. Should the public sector consider
joint ventures with the private sector and, if so, in which areas? Is there a need for new
financial and other public institutions to support the governmental program? How to
improve the availability and terms of foreign aid?
The CDR attempted to upgrade the legal areas of the southern periphery to
discourage expatriates from investing in the illegal settlements. Unfortunately, the
continuing round of fighting in the country interrupted the CDR programs while
remittances from expatriates to their families in illegal settlements were always available
despite the high degree of insecurity.
4.4 Final remarks
It is very hard at this stage to assess the long term effects of the war on slum
formation. The war has displaced slum dwellers from East Beirut and relocated them in
West Beirut.
This aspect earmarked the waning of the leadership control over land. Since this
war, public policy has been dramatically affected by the increasing religious segregation
between the Lebanese. It is becoming harder and harder for the state to draw policies to fit
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all sects and ethnic groups of Lebanon. The future of this country in this perspective is
totally unclear. However, it is interesting to research the variable alternatives which provide
social stability and support system while maintaining the rights of other groups to
accumulate wealth.
In an attempt to create the Council for Development and Reconstruction to play the
above stated role, the government did not scrutinize the importance of changing tenure
policies instead of rehabilitating the support system of the poor which was intended by the
French. Ironically, the war has proven not to affect the ways public policy in being drawn
by established leaders. Their perception of equity and justice will always skew these
policies to the benefit of one group and, therefore, will always create illegalities.
CASE STUDY: THE OUZAI CORRIDOR
6.j Building the corridor
l.a The period from 1950 to 1969.
The recent development of the "Ouzai-Khaldeh" corridor can be related to intensive
urban development projects undertaken by the state in the fifties. The major centers of the
periphery were the only urbanized areas, namely, Chiah, Ghobeiri and Bourj el Brajneh
(see map).
The allocation of a sport complex on the municipal limits of Beirut and the golf club
in a two miles miles aimed at creating a luxurious and highly serviced residential area
between the city and the airport (see map). The pre-existing conditions in the east suburbs,
such as a prominent industrial zone and a rapidly expanding refugee settlements made the
city perceive the south of Beirut as a new and highly urbanized city. However, the
expansion of this area was blocked by the international airport to the south which rendered
the area not only speculative but restricted to a certain clientele who could afford the
compliance with zoning regulations and building codes.
Dr. Wafaa Charafedine, an architect planner, related the development of the corridor
to three major factors: first, the presence of large public facilities in the area such as Beirut
International Airport, the Gulf Club, the sports complex, and the Lebanese University
complex. Second, government officials made municipal and public land accessible to
developers through illegal transfer of ownership. Third, the state use of the term Mushaa
(collective) to describe municipal land encouraged residents to acquire land in the corridor.
Consequently, the land conflict in Ouzai is not a direct product of displacements, but a
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combination of state policies towards urban development, corruption, and misuse of
terminology.
By the end of the fifties (58,59)1 and early sixties the Ouzai area witnessed a
sudden and unstructured urbanization process. The events of 1958 resulted in the formation
of three illegitimate2 settlements: Ouzai, Ramel, and Hay el Sellom around the northern
borders of the airport 3. During the latter parts of the sixties, these settlements consolidated
into permanent structure and were informally provided with services. The state consent on
the existence of the settlements aimed at preventing a new social conflict between
unprivileged Muslims (not differentiating between Sunni and Shiite) and the government.
1.b The period from 1970 to 1975
In the seventies, the illegitimate sector began to expand rapidly together with the
Palestinian camps in the surroundings. Farid Salhab, a former general director of
transportation, states: "In one year the illegitimate sector increased by ten times, from a
surveyed and informally consented 64 structures to 640 permanent structures. Corruptive
administration, feudal hierarchy, and obsolete exclusive powers have paralyzed the state
control over settlements' growth. It is paradoxal to admit that over a year no officials,
building inspectors, or police patrols have noticed the massive constructions on the
southern gate of the capital".
1 In 1958, the country was ravaged by a limited strife between Muslim nationalists and the army. The
clashes ended with the presidency of Camille Chamoun. No displacements were reported as a result of
the riots, however, new migrants occupied vacant municipal land and consolidated their structures into
permanent before the reestablishment of order.
2 Illegal settlements are defined as a combination of legal ownership of the land and structure
noncomplying with governmental rules for development enacted through zoning ordinances, subdivision
regulations or building codes.
Illegitimate developments are defined as a combination of illegal ownerships of land and illegal
structures.
3 These settlements constitute the nucleus of today's settlements.
Figure 7
Aerial photography of the
Ouzai corridor by 1962. Houses
were scattered over a distance of
650 m. Until 1974 the corridor
counted only 640 illegal
construction and the roads were
improvised by early residents
(doted line represents Ali
Nasser street). The pictures
shows a sense of self imposed
setbacks and frontbacks
between the illegal
constructions.
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The substantial administrative reforms in the early seventies, namely in the civil
service, employment, and education introduced new job opportunities for unskilled labor.
The increasing tension in South-Lebanon between Israel and the P.L.O. accentuated Beirut-
ward migration, where they sought income stability and social security. Income stability
lies in the jobs provided by the airport, university, sports complex, and a prominent
industrial sector in the direct environs, while social security stems in a permanent shelter
acquired in the southern suburb. Hence, in the mid seventies the area became a magnet for
southern migrants as it provided illegally subdivided lots and housing at affordable rates.
The outbreak of the civil war in the late seventies has affected the urban and social
fabric of the area. Contrary to former practices which were characterized by illegitimate
constructions and land invasions, displaced groups from demarcation lines and East Beirut
settled within vacant structures. The settlement process took two aspects. The first is the
invasion of luxurious condominiums on the southern littoral by Arab tribes and Kurds who
originally were slum dwellers in the East Sector. The second is the overdensification of
legal quarters which necessitated illegal additions to existing structures in order to
accommodate the displaced masses.
"At every armistice a dynamic reconstruction process takes place in each
neighborhood, street, or building. What has been constructed illegally
during the war is renovated legally in truce."
(Abdul-Ahad; URBA no.196, July 1983: p.p.64-66)
The state was unable to compensate the losses in the southern suburb thus
condoning illegal additions if additional charges are paid. The frequent outburst of
hostilities prevented the state assessing the number of illegalities and collecting fees. During
the forced absence of authorities, illegal constructions responded to the growing demand
for commercial space to substitute for destroyed Central Business District. The religious
segregation of urban communities transformed the southern periphery into a homogeneous
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Shiite Community. Consequently, Shiite expatriates in Africa and the Arab Gulf were
motivated to increase their investments in a thriving informal sector within the southern
periphery.
i.c The period between 1978 and 1982
In March 11, 1978 a vast military operation undertaken by the Israeli army in the
South, displaced 32,000 Shiites families from 14 villages (Orient le Jour, March 20,
1978). The influx ended up with 250,000 of which 72% came directly to Beirut. At the
beginning the refugees were scattered in and around West Beirut and were divided into
three groups: the first occupied dilapidated structures near the demarcation lines or invaded
vacant units in the city, the second stayed temporarily with relatives in the southern suburb
until the end of the operations, and the third received tents from social welfare
organizations and were temporarily allowed to camp on municipal land in the Ouzai
corridor. As the military operation was coming to an end, the Ministry of Interior
sponsored organized travels to help the poor families return to their villages, only 3500
families responded to the program. The reburst of hostilities between the two Beiruts
cancelled the program and gave way to refugees to remain in the capital.
Due to the tension around the demarcation lines, the refugees were forced to
reevacuate and resettle in the Ouzai with their compatriots because the existing housing
stock in the city and the suburb could not accommodate the demand for shelter. Thus,
illegitimate invasions seemed to be the only alternative in the lack of public support to
refugeesl. However, the refugees refused to describe their relocation as illegitimate. An
interview with a 1978 settler revealed the confusion over land tenure in the Area. Hassan
1 One should not deny that the state mobilized all available resources to help the refugees.
Unfortunately, the outbreak of the hostilities in the capital by June shifted the political attention
towards the internal conflict. The permanent settlement of refugees in the corridor was temporarily
ignored by the state.
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Nehmeh, a 78 years old man, stated:
"In my village municipal land is not different than the old form of Miri and
Mushaa. As a matter of fact all villagers use Miri, Mushaa, and Kharaj
terminologies to describe communal and municipal land. We have access to these
lands on a quota basis, and we consider the municipal council a form of
community organization since it is represented by members of the
community... the Ouzai corridor encompasses municipal lands which we consider
accessible to all member of the Muslim community, namely the Shiites.Further,
the municipal representatives are Shiites and they should know that land is
accessible to who ever reclaims it".
The refugees' perception of land tenure is confused due to the introduction of the
municipal system under the French mandate. As stated earlier, the municipalities around the
Beirut area played a different role than the ones in rural areas which restrained the
accessibility of the poor to communal land. This perception strengthened my belief that the
modifications imposed over the previous land tenure systems had created a confusion over
land use and, therefore, generated settlements considered by the authorities as illegitimate
and by the settlers as a legal right to access land.
1.d The post 1983 era.
In 1982, and during the Israeli siege to Beirut, all settlers moved back to the South
and by the time they returned a new administration was ruling the country under President
Gemayel, a Maronite leader of the extreme right. The new administration embarked on a
slum clearance project under the supervision of a Franco-Lebanese team. Their attempts to
upgrade the legal slums were rejected by the Shiites military factions because the state was
upgrading legal slums to cover its practices in other domains, namely the redevelopment of
the corridor without considering the existence of the settlements. An Important Shiites
clergyman, stated during a Friday speech, that the Ouzai settlers have legal rights over this
land and the state ought not deny it.
Figure 8
Updated aerial photography of
the Ouzai corridor in 1983. The
illegal constructions have
bordered the runways which
forced the authorities to build a
concrete fence around the
airport. Further, primary and
secondary road have been layed
without infrasti'icture (doted
line shows Ali Na-ser street).
The Ouzai settlement extends
along 2.5 km and contains
approximately 10.000 housing
units. The sense of order which
prevailed before the war have
been replaced by overdensified
quarters.
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The answer to the question, where did these rights come from, was obtained
through a series of interviews with settlers like Mr Nehmeh who all expressed their
confusion about the land tenure system and the role of the state in providing access to land
for the poor. However, this confusion points up the difference between the state's
perception of tenure and the settlers' understanding of the tenure system is responsible in
creating settlements.
Historically, the Ouzai corridor was transformed, in one decade, to a mix of
industrial, commercial, and housing sectors. The structures represent 40% of the built
environment in the southern periphery. Over seventy percent of the corridor structures were
built during the period 1978-1988. Such a thriving illegitimate sector attracted more low
income groups to the area as well as political concern toward incorporating settlements
residents Shiites military factions and, therefore, influence the ongoing conflictl.
Remittances sent back by migrant workers to their families were mostly invested in
commercial activities. Ali Nasser, an illegitimate shop owner states: "We need a secure
monthly income to survive this period of uncertainty. Yet, we cannot depend on the state
for our basic needs such as hospitalization, social security, jobs and subsidies. Commercial
investments guarantee enough revenues to make us independent of any agency". Other
settlement residents, who preferred to be kept anonymous, affirmed that "the corridor
provided the poor with large tracts of unused land to establish housing and industrial
activities. Historically, the poor had access to the land and so do we". Thus, "land was
used as a production input and a consumption good" (Harvey, 1982: ch. 11) to deprive the
poor from exploiting it.
LZ Consolidation as a response to repressive state practices
1 The percentages has been drawn from data provided by Dr. Charafeddine.
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Despite the flow of capitals from expatriates, the state has been instrumental
indirectly in upgrading and developing the settlements. The government was indirectly
subsidizing the residents, through the provision of infrastructure free of charge, by
upgrading the Ouzai boulevard. Officials reported that they modernized the boulevard
because it is the Southern entrance of Beirut and not because of the illegal settlements.
Thus, the state still neglects the presence of the settlements by advocating former proposals
of the sixties. Each administration proposed a new Master Plan, the last being released in
1986, which recommended the expansion of the airport over 40% of the Ouzai settlement
and, therefore, threatened the integrity of the commercial strip. These practices were not
recent. In the previous chapter I analyzed the state's interventions through planning. In this
section I will review the law's which prevented the poor from access to land.
In May first 1950 the state passed the first building regulations concerning the
corridor. This law required the following:
-1500 sqm is the minimum plot size (an area which makes
most of the plots in noncompliance.
-Only 30% of the plot is builtable.
-The dimensions of the main fagade are: L > 30m. , H 5 16m.
-Set backs from the both sides are 6m.
-A minimum of 20m is required between the building and the
property limits from the back.
A Muslim former Minister stated that the law coincided with former visions
concerning the future of the corridor. It, naturally, restrained the poor from constructing
their land or selling it individually. The unsellable lots (existing lot averaged between 350
to 700 sqm.) were subdivided illegally and sold during periods of uncertainty to migrants
who accepted the risks derived from constructing in the corridor. The process of illegal
subdivision and construction intensified with the massive displacements from South
Lebanon. In January, 1983 the newly appointed administration attempted to organize the
1 Law NQ 1107 of 10/26/1983.
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slums by force and passed the following law:
"...all constructions and / or additions, either vertical or horizontal,
will be demolished and without compensation on the following
premises: -Others' properties with no written document from the legal
owner. -Public properties.-Inside expropriated zones and approved
"traces" of public projects. -On private holdings owned by the state,
municipalities, or public institutions".
This law, known as Law N 13, considered any construction after 03/26/64 illegal.
Apparently, the authorities attempted to differentiate between the pre-1964 settlers and
others who invaded land during the sixties, seventies, and eighties. Naively, the authorities
wanted to differentiate between squatting and the problem of tenure by maintaining the
dispute over land restricted to 640 cases and that all new settlements should be removed.
However, the post-1964 settlers insisted that the issue is the right to have access to
municipal land and that they were not squatters.
In addition, the state adopted two other strategies to minimize the problem of
squatting in the corridor. They either included Khaldeh (i.e.the Druzes area) in the
definition of the corridor which decreased the density from 650/ha. to 150/ha., or released
population censuses which did not coincide with reality. While the state, headed by
President Gemayel, ranged the number between 15.000 and 20.000, many other sourcesi
presented a range of 45.000 to 50.000 resident. The decrease in the number of persons
involved in the conflict should have had an impact on the amount of foreign aids allocated
to the corridor and the persons eligible for aid creating, therefore, disparities among
settlers. Contrarily to the expectations of the authorities, foreign aids were allocated
through private agencies to avoid the corruption in public institutions. Thus, funds were
based upon private resources and not the public censuses.
1 The various sources are: As-Safir, July 4,1983. Random sample testing presented by the General
Directorate of Planning, Juin 1984. BECOM.
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The state attitude towards the settlements , consequently, complicated the problem
and the residents became convinced that resolving land conflicts in the corridor should be
not treated as an independent phenomena from the overall Lebanese situation. Today they
refuse to cooperate with a state which resources are manipulated by a minority, its policies
are formulated by established elites, and its practices are irrational. They viewed that equity
and justice cannot be implemented yet in Lebanon.
[ The consolidation process
3.a Building on municipal land
Before 1976, the construction of a shelter in an overnight was more important than
its location. Subsequent to occupying a plot, the family builds a 35 sqm. room using
concrete blocks for walls, wood struts and zinc sheets for roofing. These materials allowed
the family to expand its structure according to the state of insecurity in the country. After
1978, the choice of a location along the boulevard became the primary interest of the
settlers. The head of the family starts by allocating a desirable site and defines it either with
stones or with a primitive steel fence. The process is supervised by senior occupants or
neighbors who indirectly represent the socio-political organization which select residents on
the micro level. Later, the design and execution is bid to local contractors who then take the
responsibility to deliver the finished house in record time. These units include sanitary and
kitchen equipments similar to these provided within units in the legal areas.
3.b Building the private properties
Private properties in the area are divided into two categories: 1) Ones that are owned
by inheritors in the form of shares, 2) The others are individually owned by Christian
elites. In the first category, many of the occupants bought shares equivalent to the plot they
4
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use. Contrary to Jordan, as described by Razzazi, families settled first in the corridor and
then negotiated for land price. However, small Christian shareholders who owned land in
the corridor were not in the position to retain their properties for further speculation for two
reasons: First, the economic pressure prevailing since 1984 forced middle income families
to trade land for capital. Second, the increasing religious segregation between East and
West Beirut prevented Christian landlords from developing their properties in the West
sector. The second category allowed the intervention of real estate brokers who mediated
between Christian elites and Shiite investors. For instance a 3000 sq.m. property had many
Christian and Muslim shareholders. A politically empowered broker bought all the
Christian's shares equivalent to 2000 sq.m. at low prices, defined the desirable area
equivalent to these shares, then he subdivided it into eight 150 sq.m. parcels and eight 100
sq.m. parcels, and later sold them at market value. Many residents were capable to afford
prices of small lots that do not comply with building codes. The development of private
properties is somewhat different from the one on public lands. Building standards seemed
more homogeneous, as well as the layout and the setbacks. However, the prevailing sense
of organization in the settlements is also related to the concern of early settlers about the
layout of the roads and self imposed setbacks2 .
6. The creation of a thriving land market in the corridor
In the early eighties, both the decline in oil prices and the Gulf war affected the
demand for land dramatically. Contracts of hundreds of Shiites in the Gulf were terminated
with the persistence of the Iran-Iraq war. Consequently, the southern periphery faced a
new influx of skilled workers who returned with their live savings and perceived land as a
secure source of investment. Thus, demand for land exceeded the supply in the corridor
1 Razzaz Omar, MCP Thesis, 1988.
2 The same process was formerly described by Collier in Squatters and Oligarches, 1974: 152.
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and prices boosted dramatically.
The settlements offered both permanent structures non-complying with building
codes and illegally subdivided land at low prices which attracted low and middle income
Shiites migrants. The persistence of the war in Lebanon hyperinflated the economy.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese pound was dramatically loosing its exchange rate against the
dollar (i.e.: in Jan. 1984, EL4=$1; in Jan. 1988, EL490=$l). Returning expatriates found
that land is a secure and stable capital investment in the absence of other alternatives.
Therefore, land prices in the West Beirut increased by 15 fold while the land value in the
settlements increased by 20 fold, however these values remained below the legal market.
The scarcity of municipal land was created by a rising number of absentee settlers
who, in the early eighties, withheld large properties for speculation. The increase in the
demand for municipal land encouraged them to subdivide these lots. A survey conducted
by a local newspaper1 traced the change in the average lot size from 550 sqm. in 1980 to
140 sqm. by 1987. The decrease in sizes reflects the thriving land market in the corridor
and the average demand for plot size.
The demand for land in the settlements necessitated the expansion of the corridor
towards the East and the South where municipal land were available. Two constraints faced
this expansion; to the East the established Shiites family "Nasser" owned most of the
properties and protected their domains with military elements, to the south the Druze
rejected the socio-political expansion of the Shiites together with the settlements. These
constraints increased the hegemony over commercial and industrial spaces in the corridor.
As theories confirm, original settlers (1978 refugees) sold their plots, which have
direct access to the boulevard, to the highest bidders. They relocated in less desirable areas
1 Al-Safir, July 1987: ten consecutive editions.
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in the corridor where the character tended to be more residential. Abu al-Hassan, a soldier
of fortune, considered this process a blessing from God. In 1983, he moved off the
highway to a residential cluster and sold his former unit at a price which enabled him to
start a small business. However, contrary to conventional planning theory and practice, the
high degree of insecurity and instability in the country encouraged settlement residents to
increase their investments in the housing, industrial, and commercial sectors.Thus,
insecurity lead to consolidation and tenure becomes a minor concern for the growth and the
development of the settlements.
.6 The present urban fabric of the corridor
As described previously, the corridor was subject to several planning schemes since
the fifties. It was primarily conceived by Ecochard as a "Ville Nouvelle" (new town)
between the airport and the city of Beirut, Egli zoned it as a luxurious residential area
bounded by large public complexes, and the IRFED report proposed it as a mixed use area:
residential along the airport boulevard, and touristic along the littoral. However, conflicts
over land tenure and historical events in 1958, 1978, and 1982 created informal
settlements.These settlements started over 24 ha. and reached 70 ha. before the civil war.
After 1982, the return of Shiite expatriates from the Gulf countries accelerated the growth of
the settlements. The corridor offered a profitable land market during the absence of legal
authorities andtherefore, extended along 2.5 km. of the Western littoral and occupied an
area of 200 acres.
5.a The Ouzai settlement
The corridor contains two major settlements, the Ouzai and the Jnah. The Ouzai
settlement is composed of 51% public land, 12% private land, and 33% shareholders who
constructed arbitrarily on lots equivalent to their shares. The total housing units in the Ouzai
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are 7000 units approximately1 distributed over 3500 structures. Dr. Charafeddine reported
that the occupancy rate is six and the vacancy rate2 is about 8%. Thus, the population
number is about:
[7000-(8%)]*6=[7000-560]*6=38,640 residents
This number, therefore, coincides with the data obtained by the various sources
about the population size of the corridor, hence, the official numbers are not adequate and
do not reflect the intensity of the conflict.
The Ouzai settlement extends along the southern entrance of West Beirut. It
expanded lately along Hussein Nasser road to encounter the illegal settlements along the
airport boulevard. The major facilities in the area are:
- The Ouzai Mosque combined to an Islamic center (the land belongs to the Sunni
Waqf),
- Two Shiite Mosques illegitimately constructed, one on the Ouzai boulevard and
the other on the Aiport boulevard.
- Two Husseinyyats (Shiite Islamic Center),
- Two permanent posts for the Amal movement (illegitimate construction),
- One permanent post for the Hezbollah (illegitimate construction),
- Center for social development (Sunni Waqf),
- Rehabilitation center for the physically handicapped (Sunni Waqf),
- Two private beach clubs with restaurants (privatly owned with legal tenure and
construction).
Most structures have two levels, the first is restricted to commercial activity, and the
second contains two housing units. Constructions on the West side of the Ouzai boulevard
have direct access to the sea. They transformed the sand beaches into part of their private
domains. Hence, the existing private beach clubs benefitted from the situation to exert high
entry fees on members. The area has the potential to be a touristic area which might secure
1 Source: Office of social development.
2 Vacancy rate is due to absentee landlordism.
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revenues to municipalities and local businesses. The problem of the Ouzai settlement
extends beyond inappropriate investments. The lack of public services, the overcrowded
use of land,and the invasion of retained land for the airport's expansion are the major
features of the area.
5.b The Jnah settlement
The Jnah is relatively a recent development which only encompass municipal land.
The area is located on the immediate South West boundary of West Beirut. Its expansion is
threatening both private and municipal properties of the capital. Dr. Charafeddine related
the initiation of the settlement to the following:
- The first wave of invasions occurred in 1958 after the civil strife. Twenty houses
were built around an existing church1 (Our Lady of Jnah, now destroyed).
- In 1975, the municipal council of Ghobeiry granted the high Shiite Council
15,200 sq.m. to build a hospital for the poor Shiites.
The construction of the hospital (Az-Zahra) attracted labor and small businesses to
the area. After the end of the constructions, labors and businesses consolidated their shacks
into permanent structures. They took advantage of the chaotic situation during 1978, 1983,
and 1984 to consolidate their settlements. Migrants from the Beqaa region in the East of the
country bought parcels in the area through phony real estate agents who assumed legal
rights over these lands. The conflict over the Jnah settlement accentuated when the state
attempted to evict and destroy the structures in 1983. As a result, the residents, of Shiite
affiliation, incorporated into Amal and Hezbollah to insure a political and military support
for their "rights". The Jnah contains approximately 8000 residents in 1600 structure. As in
1 It appears that early settlers in Jnah settlements were Christians. These sites were legalized in 1962 as
they were connected to electricity, water, sewage, and telephone systems.
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the Ouzai, the character of the buildings is the same and commercial activities are restricted
to the main streets.
Lf The choice of the corridor for illegal settlements
To conclude my argument, I had to understand whether the Ouzai had been chosen
for its location or because of the availability of municipal and disputed land. The
spokesman of "Hezbollah" in the corridor explained why they moved to the corridor and
how he was politically involved:
"Since 1975, the southern suburb became geographically limited. The growth
rate in our community is very high and the average household is seven. Due to
the massive displacements we had to find an alternative to the overdensified
Southern suburb. As a militant I invaded first a vacant unit in the city. Then to
survive the economic pressure I needed land to start a business. The cheapest 200
sq.m. I could find in the legal areas were 40,000L.L. ($4000 in 1984). I was told
by my relatives that a similar plot is worth 10,000L.L. ($1000 in 1984) in the
Ouzai and it has direct access to the street which makes business possible. When
I settled in the corridor I was told about our right to use the municipal land as is
the case in the village... "
I understood later that the invasion of private properties was due to the inavailability
of remaining municipal lands along the boulevard. Settlers on private properties were
accumulating the required capital to purchase from landowners the shares which represent
their lots. It is perhaps clear now that the genesis of illegal settlements has two
requirements: one is the need for land by the poor, and the other is the availability of
municipal or public land which were derived from Mushaa or Miri.
6l Concluding remarks
The political involvement of settlers is still opposing the state's decision to
redevelop the corridor. This redevelopment was induced in the new master plan released in
June 1986 which neglects the problem over land tenure in the Ouzai. The transfer of land
ownership from Miri and Mushaa to municipal control deprived the poor, living within
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municipal limits, from access to land.The conflict over land ownership started in the early
fifties between municipalities and landed elites on one side and the poor on the other which
kept most of the municipal land undeveloped. The conflict has been later accentuated due to
the massive invasions of lands and the state practices in dealing with the problem.
Thus, informal urban development along the southern littoral should not be seen as
an independent phenomena of the overall political conflict in Lebanon. Settlement formation
should be tied to the dramatic modifications on the system of land tenure which did not take
into account the diversity and the complexity of the Lebanese society. First, large tracts of
land have been intentionally kept unused while demand for land and housing was rapidly
increasing. Second, the lack of taxes on vacant properties increased speculation and kept
opportunity costs low. Third, the confusing state of land ownership in the corridor
encouraged local residents to reuse land and claim historical rights over its title. Fourth, the
flow of financial capital through remittances to lower and middle income groups trapped in
an overdensified suburbs provided them with incentives to seek better living conditions in
the corridor during periods of state weakness.
The present war has facilitated land invasions and created a thriving land market
with illegally subdivided lots. Municipal councils and Christian landed elites in the corridor
are the main losers in this process. The municipalities are not collecting fees derived from
construction permits and land transactions to help recover the cost of services in the legal
densified areas. The religious segregation imposed by the war restrained Christian elites
from managing their properties and, therefore, control the land market. Summing up, none
of the legal owners is benefiting from the ongoing urban development and as the religious
segregation is accentuated, Christian owners are more likely to give in to offers, by Shiites
estate brokers, at below market prices.
an c g uti iit
The transfer from the communal form of ownership to municipal control resulted
in the invasion of public land, while on the other hand recent illegal acquisitions of
private properties are argued by Shiites settlers in terms of social justice. They accuse
Christian elites to accumulate capital by monopolizing national resources since
independence and purchasing large tracts of land on the Ouzai corridor illegally at prices
below market value.
The effect that the illegitimate developments had on the economy during periods
of uncertainty was positive for several reasons. First, it provided construction jobs to
unskilled labor. Second, capitals were invested in small businesses and industries in an
area which has been neglected by the state during periods of economic prosperity.
Third, the illegitimate settlements in the corridor provide approximately 10,000 housing
units for low income families1 . Fourth, the creation of commercial and industrial axis
within settlements has provided West Beirut with small scale businesses and industries
which replaced the loss of similar services formerly provisioned by the east sector.
As a result, the settlers' perception of access to land and justice did not change
despite the fact that the state exerced repressive policies. Doebele described similar
situations in the developing countries "While tenure is generally considered as a legal
category, it is, just as fundamentally, a matter of the state of mind of the persons
concerned" (Doebele, 1978:110). It is clear that "The legal system has significance only as
far as the state can enforce it and, thus, force the different groups to conform to the law of
the state" (Razzaz, 1988:35). When institutions are rendered inefficient and the central
government autonomy has been entirely eroded by ongoing hostilities and internal political
strife, the state faces two alternatives. It either adopts repressive policies to control the
conflict and, therefore, realizes its inability to implement them, or acknowledges the gap
1Survey done in January 1988 by the author.
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between what the law requests and what is enforceable Thus submitting to consolidation.
Here, two questions are raised to understand the importance of land as a secure
investment for the poor.
1) Did the settlements improve the living conditions of the poor? if so,
2) To what extent was land access instrumental in achieving these improvements?
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
During the development of this study, it has been clear that the land conflicts cannot
be treated independently from the socio-political changes that occurred since the turn of the
century. The four periods, which distinguished the development of Lebanon, offered
different types of land relations between the poor and the state. This variety of land
relations affects future departures when addressing the problem of access to land by the
poor. These strategies are summarized as follows:
a) The Ottoman granted Mushaa land to the poor in the form of private and
registered holdings. However, this privatization did not provide the poor
with the required support system they need to face economic declines and,
therefore, maintain land ownership. The consequences were dramatic. Only
the lords could afford the obligations associated with private properties,
namely the taxes, thus expanding their properties.
b) The French attempted in a very short period, relative to the Ottoman
period, to introduce reforms to a complex society. They created institutions
which provided equal access to land among the Lebanese but without
releasing tenure, and associated these lands with the needed support system
to establish a form of social stability. The reforms were manipulated by the
established aristocracy. Thus, they widened the disparities between classes
and between regions.
c) The modem state adopted a "laissez-faire" economy in which the private
sector would undertake development using all means, while the state would
support the poor. Sectarianism and corruption prevented public revenues
from being channelled to help the poor. On the contrary they were invested
into modernization projects which increased demand for vacant land.
Consequently, the poor, lacking all forms of social stability, had neither a
support system nor tenure or formal access to land.
d) The post war era presents a turning point in land accessibility. The
departure of foreign capital to finance development and the absence of the
state, over which traditional elites alienated land, released the pressure over
land and permitted the settlements of displaced groups in and around old
settlements.
The last phenomenon gave the poor a chance to force their rights for better living
conditions and, therefore, establish both a social stability through acquiring land and a
support system by building a network of commercial and industrial activities. Whether it is
CHAPTER VI
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the right way of doing it or not, the poor have succeeded in finding "a strategy" during
periods of uncertainty where the state and its institutions have failed during periods of
prosperity.
6.1 Where Do We Go From Here?
The state legislative and executive bodies are divided among the two Beirut where
the East is ruled by Christians and the West by Muslims. Any attempt to force changes, at
the moment, might result in new skewed policies either to the benefit of the settlers or to the
one of the landed elites. However, it is essential to draw a set of guidelines that should be
considered as the state embarks into rehabilitating its policies and strategies for
development in the aftermath of the civil war:
1) The development of the study suggests that land relations should be approached
by understanding both, the nature of the struggle over land between the various
classes and sects and the effect of tenure on urban development. These aspects
contributed in a one way or another to the rapid expansion of illegal settlements.
2) Since the informal settlements are restricted to the Shiite community, basing
policies on the concept of invaded land and illegal presence is likely to produce an
opposing and radical attitude by the settlers against any state intervention. Doebele
points out that policies should only be viewed as their actual effects at a given time
under given circumstances.
3) The historical analysis suggests that neither a system where land has been
nationalized and fully controlled by the Ottoman and French, nor a system where
the market has been determinating the allocation of land during the post-
independence era has proven sufficient for solving the problem of providing the
5Land conflicts in Beirt-
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poor with formal access to land. Further, the previously applied strategies were
unable to halt the widening disparities in the land ownership and income
distribution. The present phenomenon should be carefully analyzed and assessed as
to what extent the settlements have responded to the needs of the poor.
4) The cancellation of Islamic property tax by the Ottoman, and the Ottoman
property tax by the French, has left the Lebanese state with no property tax
revenues since 1943, which had increased speculation on land dramatically.
Consequently, large tracts of resourceful land were taken out from the market, and
hence, depriving the poor from access to land.The authorities should reconsider the
use of Islamic form of property taxes based upon equity as an instrument to reduce
speculation, instead of keeping the 2/3 of the municipal budget heavily dependent
on the construction permits and state funds.
5) Doebele, (1978:123) also pointed out that no specific tenure is good or bad
except as viewed as to its actual effects at a given time and under given
circumstances. Subsequent to the last two points, the poor have succeeded in
responding to their needs during periods of uncertainty. However if a property tax
system was to be applied and the state was to legalize the tenure by turning it into
individual freehold, two repercussions might evolve and are described by Razzaz
(1987:47).
First, if the same conventional approach is used in zoning, subdivision regulations,
and building codes, the effect would be to limit the ability of middle and lower
income groups to obtain housing and land. This was shown in the Ouzai area where
most empty plots were zoned as low density, upper income residential plots. As for
the existing buildings, limitations on vertical and horizontal expansion have been
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introduced. This rendered the area as a whole much less responsive to future
demand for low income housing, a pressing present and future need of the urban
masses.
Second, private freehold will bring the land prices in the area to the formal land
market level and introduce speculation. The settlers will be able to monopolize and
control the price and transfer of land in the area.
Hence, the provision of tenure in the settlements is very critical. The state is
skeptical to release tenure because of the fear that the settlers might sell out in order
to make profit. The most important is to avoid the Ottoman tax mistake and to
provide conditional tenure for instance.
6) The previous point suggests that the state must define its goals and needs
towards urban development while taking into consideration the existing conditions
and, therefore, encourages citizen participation before deciding on land policies or
tenure systems. The concept of public hearings applied recently in the United States
has helped the authorities to increase citizens' participation in the decision making
process and, therefore, decrease the number of obstacles that face implementation.
Though the aim of this study is to highlight the importance of changing the tenure
and land policies in Lebanon based upon historical precedents, which will take a while
before being considered seriously, it is, however, necessary for the state to use
mechanisms which reduce the tension between state-squatters relations. Following are
guidelines to be considered for setting up short term strategies:
(A)- The lack of municipal resources and the unjust state strategies for development
made the level of services provided in the legal areas similar to the one self-
provided by the settlers. However, the construction type prevailing in the corridor
an cn i-te in i , 
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reflected the interest of the residents to create livable neighborhoods. Despite the
political involvement of the residents in local military factions, they do not reject
any legal arrangement to obtain titles deeds. Accordingly, the authorities should
consider negotiating land tenure of both municipal and private lands if they are
sincere towards controlling the development of the settlements. Residents, as well,
should support state interventions which regulate the growth of the settlements and
introduce facilities to upgrade the image of the littoral. Shiite leaders approved the
concept of negotiation provided that bulldozering is out of question. Further, they
will be willing to negotiate over land titles and improvement fees on the condition
that the state offers reasonable and subsidized1 prices.
(B)_ The previous point suggests that technical and bureaucratic procedures,
besides the influence of established landed elites on legislations, have not solved the
conflict over tenure and development rights in the corridor. It is perhaps time for the
conflicting groups to consider a process of mediation where each group is resigned
to reach a solution which does neither undermine the state's authority nor the poor's
rights for better living conditions.
(C)- The state must recognize its inability to enforce regulations and order in the
corridor during the last fifty years and its incapability to do so in the foreseen
future. Therefore, the state must not release Master Plans, such as the 1986 one,
which contained repressive zoning and building codes that limited the potential of
development of the lower income groups.
1 The estimated cost to upgrade the corridor in 1984 was EL. 125 million equivalent to $25 million. In
1988 it is estimated around EL. 17.76 billion equivalent to $ 48 million. However, the estimated
revenues from construction indemnities in the corridor in 1984 were L. 86 million equivalent to $ 21.5
million (source: The Middle East economic consultants, report on the reconstruction of Beirut, June
1985,:103).
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(D)- Following the latter recommendation, the state should try to understand the
different claims existing in the settlements. The historical analysis revealed three
types of residents: (a) residents with rights over Mushaa' properties, (b) residents
with historical and legal rights over private properties, and (c) squatters who
invaded land during recent state weakness and who claimed historical rights.
(E)- Many mechanism can be used to facilitate development in the proper sense.
First, the state can negotiate over the FAR, the allowable built areal (land coverage
ratio), and zoning regulations that would attract developers to invest in a specific
area. Second, the scarcity of land in Beirut encouraged housing developers to
perceive land in the corridor for future developments, thus the state can provide a
density increase for them inspite the fact that they pay an extra charge that would be
transferred to upgrade the settlements, and allocate a certain percentage of their
projects to low income housing.
(F)- The survey done by Dr. Wafa Charafeddine in 1984 suggests that the
economic strip is vital and important to the area. My recent visit to the site in 1988
enforced my belief that the area's best use is a mix of tourism, commerce, and
residential. The littoral, a unique seashore in the metropolitan area, offers the
possibility of creating viable and profitable resort centers (Centres Balneaires). The
injection of such facilities requires a spatial reorganization of the waterfront. The
experience of the East Sector,where investors purchased municipal land to allocate
their projects, has been totally successful. Since the state still owns vacant lands in
the area which can be leased or sold to Shiite investors who are willing to develop
the region. In this perspective, the legal presence of large projects will facilitate the
1This term is translated laterally from the Lebanese building code.
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incoming of financial corporations to the corridor (i.e. these financial institutions
have been skeptical in opening branches along the Ouzai boulevard).
(G)- The present physical conditions in the area requires substantial intervention by
plannersl. The fact that the majority of the settlers used densification as a strategy
to consolidate, yet only few took the incentive to impose front and back setbacks
which disproportioned the density in the corridor. Further, they protected their
environment with plants and gardens. According to Dr. Charafeddine, the density
around Ali Nasser street reached 500 persons/ha (1987:93) and decreases to 150 in
the area between Ouzai and Jnah.
(H)- One of the long term strategies that is interesting to look at is land sharing 2 .
Accordingly, this device permits the state to increase the use of land while
relocating the residents in better structures and provide them with tenure. Landed
elites can, therefore, have access to the part of their land and construct touristic and
commercial facilities depending on the location and scale of the projects. This
process is supervised by the state who negotiates over regulations using the
previously mentioned mechanisms, if both the poor and the elites interests are
served.
Finally, it turns out that a look at land conflicts of the last few years only does not
give the observer the full facts of land tenure situation in Lebanon and is therefore of
limited value. It does, however, shed some light on the factors which might direct
development in ways that the society, as a whole, can benefit the most. Thus, development
should not be viewed as alternative arrangements of profit maximization, but rather a way
of organizing human resources.
1See aerial photographs.
2An explanation for these concepts is provided in appendices II and III respectively.
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6.2 Postscript
During May 1988, at the time this is being written, armed conflict has broken out
near the Ouzai corridor, specifically between the Amal and Hezbollah Shiites factions,
over land control and the tenure of the legal Southern Suburb of West Beirut. Some 200
persons have already been killed. The bitterness now created will surely make
compromise solutions even more different than before.
Appendix I
The detail of the political structure of Lebanon during the Ottoman period is
described by Baaklini (1979, ch. 1, passim):
The emir (prince) at the top of the pyramid received his investiture from the Turkish
wali who acted as the representative of the Ottoman Sultan. Each community had its emir
whose autonomy extended over a defined area. This princedom was manifested through
political, religious, or elitist leadership. Access to land and resources was partially
restricted to followers and "fideles" of the group leader. Thus, land was granted to faithful
followers despite their religion and sect. After the emir came the Muquati'ji (the district
governor) who could be either a Muqaddam or a sheikh. The emir belonged to the
muqaddam group but was considered primus inter pares. The Muqati'jis power varied in
accordance with the wealth of the region he controlled and the power he was able to mass
when needed. Usually a Muqati'ji controlled a large piece of land, comprising several
villages, through his deputies who were entrusted with tax collection (some of the Muqatiji
families are still prominent in Lebanese politics today) (Baaklini, 1976: 34). This political
structure resulted in perpetual conflicts between the landed elites who were in perpetuous
competition to maintain their ranks and control over land titles. The social and political
crisis in the heights of Mount-Lebanon affected to a greater extend access to land and crops
by poor peasants.
Whoever became a regional or local administrator would transfer part of his grants
to religious institutions to insure their spiritual and institutional support as their influence
over the masses was growing. The Maronites, in particular, had an organized religious
institution, founded in Rome and influenced by western modes of equity and social justice.
By the turn of this century, these institutions (Christian and Druze) owned a considerable
amount of land in Mount-Lebanon. The rising influence of religious institutions as modern
organizations based upon equity and freedom threatened the integrity of the feudal families.
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Appendix II
The commander of the Druze militia in Khaldeh prevented, in June 1985, the
construction of an illegitimate resort along the waterfront. He personally supervised the
demolishment of 25 shops which were constructed in an overnight. He stated that "the
Ouzai settlements will not be allowed to expand into our territories (Khaldeh). He compared
them to the cancer disease as they will soon fill out the land with their community and,
therefore, increase their military and political power in the area". He affirmed that "if
illegitimate developments occur in Khaldeh, the Druzes ought to be the beneficiaries and not
the Shiites". I realized that the Druzes are intentionally rejecting the process of illegal
developments in their areas to be able to attract investors in search for formal access to land
in the direct environs of West Beirut by offering competitive land prices to the ones in the
corridor. However, these strategies have not been so far successful for several reasons.
First, the airport represent both physical and visual barriers between Khaldeh and West
Beirut, therefore, people are reluctant to live beyond it. Second, before 1982 Khaldeh was
considered a neighborhood unit with upper middle income Sunni groups (i.e. two former
Sunni Prime Ministers used to live there), after the Israeli invasion many houses have been
destroyed and stolen by local residents (majority Druzes) which enforced the belief that any
person's assets are endangered if located outside his community. Third, since the
expectation of the law being enforced is minimal, small scale entrepreneurs prefer to invest
in the corridor instead of Khaldeh though revenues generated in this area are higher by 20
fold'. Fourth, the Shiites have proven to be active in developing commercial activities (see
map of commercial activities along the Ouzai boulevard), therefore, the Druzes are not only
withstanding the physical expansion of settlement but also the trade competition the Shiites
will bring along.
1 This approximation was given by an entrepreneur in the Corridor who formerly had a shop in Khaldeh
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Appendix III
The following summary on Community Land Banking has been introduced by Shann
Turnbull during a workshop for the Special Interest Group in Urban Settlements
(SIGUS) at M.I.T., April 1987.
What is a Community Land Bank (CLB) ?
A CLB is a basic unit of local government in the form of a self financing
corporation which owns all the land in its precinct and whose stock is only owned by the
residents who also obtain an equity interest in their dwelling.
CLB Structure
1. Units of a CLB common stock are issued pro-data to the area land occupied by each
dwelling and only residents can vote the stock with one vote per person (co-
operative principle).
2. Each dwelling unit can be freely sold by its owner subject to the CLB buying back
from the vendor the common stock associated with the dwelling and issuing this
stock to the purchaser.
3. Ownership of a dwelling and its associated common stock can be obtained either by
a cash purchase or through usage (-at say 4% p.a.). As a corollary, ownership of
dwellings and common stock is lost at the same rate without usage.
4. The price of:
a)dwellings is determined by market values and the value of the associated CLB
stock,
b)newly issued common stock is determined by market values and calculated on the
same basis as a mutual fund or a Real Estate Investment Trust (R.E.I.T.), and
c)redeemed common stock is determined by usage which could mean a discount
from its current new issue price of say 5% for every year less than twenty that the
vendor owned the dwelling.
5. Ownership of a dwelling is provided by a perpetual lease ("strata title") with all
other private land improvements owned through a limited life lease of say 40 years
with the CLB capturing all residual values.
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Appendix IV
The workshop presented by Shlomo Angel introduced a new concept of Land
Sharing as an alternative conflict resolution over land rights. This workshop was presented
to the Special Interest Group in Urban Settlements (SIGUS) at M.I.T., April 1988.
Participants in the workshop worked for three days on simulating negotiations for a land
sharing case study in Central America. Final outcomes were based upon financial analysis
and potential physical development of the site.
A summary of the Land Sharing concept is described in Shlomo Angel and
Somsook Boonyabancha paper, May, 1987.
Land Sharing - the partition of the land into two parts, one for the use by the
landlord and one for the use by the present occupants of the site - can be a pragmatic and
constructive resolution of conflicting claims. It becomes a realistic compromise between
landlords and slum dwellers when the intentions of landlords to repossess the land become
clear to the residents, and when the residents decide to resist their eviction. The five
alternatives then open to the latter, arranged on a spectrum of decreasing desirability, are as
follows:
1. Struggle to resist eviction and to remain on the land, occupying it in total;
2. Negotiate a land sharing agreement with the landlords and reconstruct houses
on part of the land;
3. Agree to resettle on an alternative site, usually on the urban fringe;
4. Agree to receive compensation for clearing the site; or
5. Leave the site and settle elsewhere without any compensation or assistance.
The initial position of the landlord is normally at the end of the spectrum, whereas the slum
dwellers are at the beginning.
IV
In general, the land sharing strategy involves five principles. First outlined in 1982,
these are presented in a revised form:
1. Community Organization: Negotiations for land sharing require that slum
dwellers mobilize, to counter the threat of eviction, to enlist the support of
outside organizations, and to create the indigenous leadership necessary to
represent the community in negotiations. Community participation is also
required in planning for the site reconstruction, in the allocation of plots, in the
demolition of existing structures, and sometimes in rebuilding the houses.
2. A Land Sharing Agreement: This requires a binding agreement to partition the
land. Usually the land parcel with the best development potential is allocated to
the landlord. Other parts are allocated to the existing residents to rehouse
themselves. Such an agreement must guarantee secure land tenure on the parcels
allocated to the residents, and may specify the necessary payments and time
schedules for implementation.
3. Densification: Rehousing the existing community on a smaller site requires
increased residential densities. If the original density in the slums was already
high, the new density will be even higher, unless some of the residents are
excluded by the new scheme.
4. Reconstruction; The increase in residential density and the need to clear part of
the site usually necessitates the reconstruction of houses, unless the original
densities are low enough to permit infilling of vacant plots on the site.
Rebuilding may require new forms of construction, using more permanent or
more solid materials to achieve the required densities and to upgrade the quality
of houses.
5. Capital Investment: Reconstruction requires capital from the domestic savings
of the residents or loans from outside sources. To be economically feasible,
land sharing schemes cannot rely on massive subsidies and must arrange for
housing within the peoples' ability to pay. This may occasionally require cross-
subsidies within the land sharing scheme, utilize some of the development gains
to partially offset housing reconstruction costs.
V
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